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         ABSTRACT 
 
Following Derrida, who, in The Animal That Therefore I Am, 
questions the oppositions constructed between “those who name 
themselves men” and “what he calls the animal”, this dissertation sniffs 
out the paw prints at the fringes of the Levinasian, Heideggerian and 
Hegelian oeuvres. Levinas’ encounter with the dog he names “Bobby” and 
Heidegger’s claim that “a does not exist but merely live” reveal how the 
restriction of animal figures become a self-deconstructing force within the 
philosophies.  
Hegel’s much-neglected Philosophy of Nature is important not just 
for understanding the Hegelian system, but, can contribute significantly 
to the current discussion of the question of the animal since the idea of 
Spirit binds logic, nature and spirit into a progressive being-with such 
that no element is autonomously a subject on its own. Spirit in Hegelian 
philosophy can then be regarded as a thought of community. Lastly, I look 
to Kafka’s “A Crossbreed” as an instance where the past prophesizes a 
future to-come where it may be almost possible to no longer distinguish 







Chapter One: Introduction 
There is no such thing as Animality, but only a regime of differences 
without opposition. 
Jacques Derrida, “On Reading Heidegger” 
1.1 Human-animal questions 
What is an animal? What is a human being?  
These are the question that this dissertation cannot answer. These 
too are the questions that will be asked again and again in the course of 
this dissertation. In a way, the word “animal” names not only the spectres 
of animal beings prefigured and figured in literature and philosophy, but 
also the spaces in between words. “Animal”, In this sense, “Animal” is a 
dangerous word. It appears transparent but is opaque as it is impossible 
to count, to quantify the multiplicity and multitudes of animals inhabiting 
the space of the word. Yet, philosophers ranging from Levinas to 
Heidegger have used the word, almost as if they already knew what it 
meant, when they were on their way to say something else, about, most of 
the time, the human. But what is the human? When asking these 
unanswerable questions—what is an animal? What is a human being?—
what is finally placed under scrutiny is the (hand)writing of the human 
animal. By the end of this dissertation, nothing will be clearer about what 
animals or humans are. Within the limited space of this dissertation,  it is 
what human animals write about other animals and themselves in 
relation to animals that will be of interest. Reading the moments when 
animal figures appear in moments of philosophy and poetry may 
ultimately reveal more about the ghosts in writing, as Kafka refers to in a 
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letter to Milena, than truths about animals (229). The question of the 
animal is also a question of the operation and strategems of writing. To be 
precise, what any human being writes about a particular dog or the 
category of dogs in general often reveals more about the one writing than 
the subject of the discourse. Thus, keeping an eye on the question of how 
to move beyond the anthropocentric mode, this dissertation will look at 
the strategies with which non-human animals have been rescued, 
excluded, denied and crossbred across Derrida, Heidegger, Levinas and 
finally, Kafka. In treating of these texts, there will only be very brief and 
admittedly inadequate historical contextualization of the passages. In 
terms of method, this dissertation is most interested in the close reading 
of texts where animal figures play pivotal and elusive roles so the finer 
details of the unique historical context of each text read, while 
acknowledgedly important, is suspended for the moment, in order to focus 
on re-reading texts that have used or abused the word “animal”.   
1.2 Animals Disappearing 
Animals often appear in Western thought as the embodiment of 
lack. Even Nadine Gordimer, having spoken and written for a lifetime 
against South African apartheid and discrimination, in her 2001 
acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in Literature, discriminated against 
non-human animals by referring to “humans” as “the only self regarding 
animals, blessed or cursed with this torturing higher faculty, have always 
wanted to know why” (Nobelprize.org). Gordimer’s words are a 
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conventional example of the habit of singling out the unique “higher” 
abilities of the human animal via a sweeping generalization of all the 
other animals. Human writing elevates the human audience, a community 
of sovereigns, for which the writing is intended, with the exclusionary 
logic of “we are the only animals that can…”  
Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation published in 1975, famously drew 
comparisons between speciesism, discrimination against animals other 
than the human ones, and racism. It has had a strong impact on modern 
American animal rights movements. Yet, the issues of animal rights and 
of ethics with regards to the animal are not the foremost questions of this 
dissertation. In an interview, aptly named “The Paradox of Morality”, 
Levinas makes the astute point that even in animal ethics, it is the 
human-animal that comes first and takes priority: “We do not want to 
make an animal suffer needlessly and so on. But the prototype of this is 
human ethics” (172). Who or what are the beings or addressees without 
beings who inhabit the luxurious space of this “we” that Levinas uses? 
Why do “we” (and Levinas assumes, without problematization that “we” 
are his fellow human beings) have the right to decide? Before “we” can 
even begin to think animal ethics or animal rights, “the space for the event 
of what we call animals” as Matthew Calarco puts it in Zoographies, has 
to be open (emphasis author’s, 4). In other words, before we can even 
approach animal ethics, animal rights or any of the range of animal-
related activities or studies, we have to think who or what is “we” and 
“animals” or we risk having our thoughts of animal ethics become deeply 
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entangled in our notion of human ethics. Have we even thought of the 
animal, and correspondingly the human, at all? In the question of “the 
animal,” “the human” is not kept in a safe zone, but the sanctity of “the 
human” and the discourses that have been built on the word “animal” are 
also at stake. Cary Wolfe has stated in Animal Rites that “the animal has 
always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very 
heart of the constitutive disavowals and self-constructing narratives 
enacted by that fantasy figure called ‘the human’ ” (6).  
Increasingly interdisciplinary animal studies, comprising of the 
humanities, social sciences, and biological and cognitive studies have 
sought to radically rethink human-animal relations. This is to be met with 
welcome and yet, the question of the role of philosophy and literature in 
rethinking animals remains. It might be argued that it is impossible for 
the human mind to not be anthropocentric. Indeed, with the human mind, 
I can only think human thoughts; whether or not I deem them to be 
universal, they remain limitedly human. However, we do not need to think 
through the minds of non-human animals to rethink our dubious 
assumptions about animality. Even though it remains impossible to a 
limited extent to escape an anthropocentric perspective, it is still possible 
to reveal the flaws and limitations of anthropocentric logic. 
1.3 Ghostly creatures under the shroud of a word 
Though birds, cats and dogs have been domesticated and are part of 
the everyday lives of many humans, their lives are not unlike ghosts; 
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present and yet, insistently invisible. In Electric Animal, Lippit uses the 
term “spectral animals” to evoke the ghostliness of animality (1). For him, 
non-human animals “exist in a state of perpetual vanishing” (1). His work 
published in 2008 is one of several works that have appeared on the 
question of the animal since the turn of the millennium. Like many 
recently published books on the animal, Lippit acknowledges his debt to 
Derrida, stating in his introduction that “The philosophy of Jacques 
Derrida remains, throughout this work, crucial to the discussion of animal 
being” (14). Similarly, this thesis is guided by Derrida’s thoughts on 
animals.  
The ten-hour lecture Derrida gave at the 1997 Cerisy Conference, 
The Autobiographical Animal, is an event that has shown light on the 
complacency inherent in the word “animal”. The complete text of the 
lecture was published posthumously in 2008 as The Animal That 
Therefore I Am. An unfinished work, it comprises of “The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (More to Follow)”, the first essay to be published in the 
conference proceedings of the lecture and it remains the most analyzed 
part of the lecture.  Chapter 3 of the book, “And Say the Animal 
Responded” was published only in 2003. Chapter 2 “But as for me, who am 
I (following)?” and Chapter 4, “I don’t know why we are doing this” were 
published for the first time in the book. The text of Chapter 4 is a 
transcription from a recording of an improvised response Derrida makes 
to the question of the animal in Heidegger. The work has stimulated more 
work on the question of the animal in diverse and interdisciplinary fields. 
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David Wood in his 2008 essay “Thinking with Cats” has even stated that it 
reconstitutes Derrida’s “whole work as a zoophilosophy” (129). 
The question of the animal for Derrida is very much a question of 
the traditional opposition between “those who name themselves men” and 
“what he calls the animal”. To argue for either oppositionality or similarity 
would thus be missing the chance to examine the construction of the 
human/animal divide. This is perhaps why, even though The Animal That 
Therefore I Am might appear to mark the first time Derrida extendedly 
and directly addresses the question of the animal, in “Violence Against 
Animals”, Derrida states that: 
All the deconstructive gestures I have attempted to perform on 
philosophical texts [...] consist in questioning the self-interested 
misrecognition of what is called the Animal in general, and the way 
in which these interpret the border between Man and Animal. (28) 
 
Even though Derrida lists more than 80 texts in his oeuvre that address or 
invoke animals, it is not for that alone that the animal question is integral 
to Derrida’s work. The divisibility of the mark, the principle upon which 
deconstruction operates, thus wanders too into the question of the animal, 
where the borders that have been erected between animal and humans 
will show themselves to also be subjected to repeatability. 
 Further on in The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida questions 
the limit between animals and humans: 
The discussion becomes interesting once, instead of asking whether 
or not there is a limit that produces a discontinuity, one attempts to 
think what a limit becomes once it is abyssal, once the frontier no 
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longer forms a single indivisible line but more than one internally 
divided line; once, as a result, it can no longer be traced, objectified, 
or counted as single and indivisible: What are the edges of a limit 
that grows and multiplies by feeding on an abyss? (31)  
 
In When Species Meet, Haraway affirms that Derrida “understood that 
actual animals look back at actual human beings” (19) and that Derrida 
“identified the key question as being not whether the cat could ‘speak’ but 
whether it is possible to know what respond means and how to distinguish 
a response from a reaction” (20). However, referring to “The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” and “And Say the Animal Responded?” 
Haraway also states that Derrida “failed” in his obligation as “companion 
species” because he did not become curious about what the cat “might 
actually be doing, feeling or thinking (21): 
He came right to the edge of respect, of the move to respeccere, but 
he was sidetracked by his textual canon of Western philosophy and 
literature and by his own linked worries about being naked in front 
of his cat. He knew there is no nudity among animals, that the 
worry was his, even as he understood the fantastic lure of 
imagining he could write naked words. Somehow in all this 
worrying and longing, the cat was never heard from again in the 
long essay dedicated to the crime against animals. (20) 
 
For Haraway, companion species is the term that names the ideal relation 
between different species of animals, including the human one. As the 
term suggests, companion species’ are equal to each other with no 
distinction between sovereign and beast. However, Derrida’s own project 
is markedly different from that of Haraway’s. Throughout his writing on 
the human-animal question, Derrida questions the strategies, especially 
but not limited to philosophy, that have guided works that refer to or 
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refuse to refer to animals in order to construct an anthropocentric 
worldview, a philosophy, an ethics, and so on. While Haraway finds 
Derrida lacking the curiosity, proverbially of a cat, with regards to his cat, 
could it not precisely be because of Derrida’s curiosity as to the cat’s 
response that Derrida seeks to get to the heart of the matter, to the 
problem with the word “animal” that shadows even his real and singular 
cat?  In order to clear the debris of thought and language that has been 
heaped upon the word “animal”, Derrida turns to how Western 
philosophies have neglected, ostracized, or murdered, what is named “the 
animal.” Questioning Western metaphysics does not neglect the question 
of being-with or living-with animals, all of which Haraway advocates, 
unless the problems of metaphysics is erroneously assumed to be divorced 
from living. While Haraway finds it regrettable that Derrida is  
“sidetracked by the textual canon of Western philosophy and literature”, 
the sidetracking, as Haraway terms it, could turn out to be a very 
necessary detour (20).  
In When Species Meet, Haraway’s additional criticism of Derrida is 
that he makes no reference to scientific literature and experts who have 
studied and lived with animals. Haraway’s disappointment in the 
questions Derrida does not raise is an extension of Haraways’s criticism 
that Derrida is stuck in his comfort zone of Western metaphysics: 
Why did Derrida not ask, even in principle, if a Gregory Bateson or 
Jane Goodall or Marc Bekoff or Barbara Smuts or many others have 
met the gaze of the living, diverse animals and in response undone 
 9 
and redone themselves and their sciences? (21) 
 
Here, I follow Matthew Calarco in Zoographies when he questions the  
“reliance on scientific accounts of animals in grounding ethical claims 
about them” (5). Calarco notes “the question of the animal”, as adopted 
from Derrida, is “also intended to pose the question of whether we know 
how to think about animals at all” (emphasis author’s, 5). I suggest that 
“human-animal questions” are more appropriate in their plurality, and 
even more importantly, in putting to question who or which is “us” and 
who or which is “them”. Animality shadows every articulation of the 
human. Scientific experiments alone would not be able to change the 
criteria with which “mind”, “subjectivity” or “moral standing” have been 
attributed—as if it was something humans had the right to give in the 
first place. Thus, scientific experiments would not affect what Heidegger 
has to say about “animality as such” in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics when he attempts to describe what world against what it is 
not by attributing poverty to the worldhood of animals (186).   
If, as Heidegger proposes in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, “a dog does not exist but merely lives”, then animals cannot 
be regarded as beings-toward-death but, being ontologically impoverished, 
own neither life nor death as such (210). However, in the course of 
Heidegger’s philosophy it is never shown clearly that humans, or the only 
beings that Heidegger felt could be referred to as Dasein, can claim an 
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authentic relation to death or life. In The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics Heidegger searches for a grounding to his three theses: 
The thesis that ‘the animal is poor in world’ in relation to the thesis 
that ‘man is world-forming’. The relation between poverty in world 
and world-formation does not entail hierarchical assessment. 
Poverty in world as deprivation of world. (192) 
 
Knowing that his thesis would be provocative, Heidegger says that these 
distinctions between man and the animal are not necessarily hierarchical: 
May we talk of a ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ at all in the realm of the 
essential? Is the essence of man higher than the essence of the 
animal? All this is questionable even as a question. (194) 
 
With his exclamation of the “animal, what a word!” in The Animal that 
Therefore I Am, Derrida notes that Heidegger, along with other prominent 
Western philosophers, have not questioned how the word “animal” that 
humans have given themselves the right to give, has come to speak for all 
animals, regardless of differences between animals (32).  Of this word, 
Derrida writes in “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)”: 
Confined within this catch-all concept, within this vast 
encampment of the animal, in this general singular, within the 
strict enclosure of this definite article (“The Animal” and not 
“animals”) […] are all the living things that man does to recognize 
as his fellows, his neighbors or his brothers. And that is so in spite 
of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the dog […] the 
ant from the silkworm, or the hedgehog from the echidna. 
(emphasis author’s, 34) 
 
The list of animals Derrida gives is not random. It ends with allusions to 
the silkworm in Derrida’s “A Silkworm of One’s Own” and the hérisson in 
the interview “Che cos’è la poesia?” [“What is Poetry?”]. The list however, 
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begins with a lizard and specifically, the “infinite space that separates the 
lizard from the dog” (34). Following Heidegger, I will begin with the lizard. 
1.4 Poor Thing 
 In §47 of The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
writes: 
The thesis that ‘the animal is poor in world’ in relation to the thesis 
that ‘the stone is worldless’. Worldlessness as not having access to 
beings. Provisional characterization of world as the accessibility of 
beings. (196) 
 
To illustrate his argument, Heidegger brings us to an idyllic sunny scene: 
The lizard basking in the sun on its warm stone does not merely 
crop up in the world. It has sought out this stone and is accustomed 
to doing so […] Yet the lizard’s relation to the sun and to warmth is 
different from that of the warm stone simply lying present at hand 
in the sun. […]Even if we avoid every misleading and premature 
psychological interpretation of the specific1,31,3 manner of being 
pertaining to the lizard and prevent ourselves from ‘emphatically’ 
projecting our feelings onto this animal, we can still perceive a 
distinction between the specific manner of being pertaining to the 
lizard and to animals, and the specific manner of being pertaining 
to a material thing. It is true that the rock on which the lizard lies 
is not given for the lizard as rock, in such a way that it could 
inquire into its mineralogical constitution for example […] But it is 
not true to say that the lizard merely crops up as present at hand 
beside the rock, amongst other things such as the sun for example, 
in the same ways that the stone lying nearby is simply present at 
hand amongst other things.  On the contrary, the lizard has its own 
relation to the rock, to the sun, and to a host of other things. One is 
tempted to suggest that what we identify as the rock and the sun 
are just lizard-things for the lizard, so to speak. (emphasis author’s, 
197) 
 
In this famous passage, the lizard basks in the sun; it enjoys the sun, 
while the stone is merely there. The lizard is an active agent; it has 
“sought out this stone” in particular. It is perhaps notable that there is no 
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vegetation in sight. Heidegger uses the lizard as an example of the 
“specific manner of being” that differentiates a lizard, and by extension, 
all animals, from that of a material rock. Heidegger moves slowly; here it 
is not yet clear why the animal is poor in world or even what world means 
since Heidegger is precisely developing his theory of world through the 
three claims: the animal is poor in world; the stone has no world and man 
is world-forming. It is only in the next section that Heidegger will clarify 
“the sense in which the animal has and does not have world” in order to 
attain “a place from which to begin the elucidation of the concept of world” 
(xiii). The question now is not what Heidegger says about his concept of 
world, which is complex and multiple. In the chapter “The Worldhood of 
the World” in Being and Time, he gives four definitions of “world” (93).  
The question I would like to ask now is rather, what is this world that 
founds itself on the concepts that “the stone”, standing in for all merely 
material things, has none of it, and the animal both has and does not have 
it?  Right up to the section quoted, Heidegger has not clearly revealed 
why. In fact, the cautionary direction he is taking—his care not to project 
feelings onto the lizard, allowing for the radical difference of the lizard to 
be “lizard-things”—shows Heidegger is aware of the limitations of his 
position and the restricted sphere of his point of view. However, in his 
clarification that the rock is not given for the animal as rock “in such a 
way that it could inquire into its mineralogical constitution for example”, 
Heidegger shows that his vision of animality is still bound up with the 
animal’s abilities, especially what the animal cannot do or do not possess 
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as compared to humans (197).  For the lizard, the rocks would just be “just 
lizard-things”. Here, in this scene, the difference between the rock, the 
lizard and “world-forming” man is already one of activity and movement 
as compared to powerless stasis. The rock cannot move; the lizard can 
move to seek out its stone but man has the power to create “world” and 
indeed, it is man’s hand, not that of the ape, but Heidegger’s hand, that 
writes and creates this “world” where these three distinctions exist.  
 What Heidegger calls “just lizard-things” is differentiated from the 
access humans have to things, or as Heidegger calls it, the rock “as such”, 
in that “ just lizard-things” to lizards are “just” “things” and not “a being”. 
The rock can thus never be vorhanden to lizards. Still in §47 of The 
Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics, Heidegger writes: 
When we say that the lizard is lying on the rock, we ought to cross 
out the word ‘rock’ in order to indicate that whatever the lizard is 
lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, and yet it is 
not known to the lizard as a rock. […] whatever it is is not 
accessible to it as a being. The blade of grass that the beetle crawls 
up, for example, is not a blade of grass for it at all; it is not 
something possibly destined to become part of the bundle of hay 
with which the peasant will feed his cow. The blade of grass is 
simply a beetle-path on which the beetle specifically seeks beetle-
nourishment, and not just any edible material in general. Every 
animal as animal has a specific set of relationship to its sources of 
nourishment, its prey, its enemies, its sexual mates, and so on. 
(emphasis author’s, 198) 
 
Since Heidegger’s thesis covers all animals except man, here he brings up 
the example of the beetle, as if whatever is fundamental for it would too be 
fundamental for the lizard and the dog (who will be appearing soon in this 
tragic scene) but not the human. Heidegger, like many other philosophers, 
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wants to reserve a special place in ontology for the human figure. It is now 
clear that “lizard-things” would never be paralleled by “human-things” 
because “lizard-things” signifies a lack—an inability to access the rock “as 
a being”. The beetle is unable to conceive of the future of the blade of 
grass, of its destiny—the being of the blade of grass is lost to the beetle in 
time. It has a limited engagement with the blade of grass, which is just a 
“beetle-thing” to the beetle, upon which it “specifically seeks beetle-
nourishment”. Even in our limited sense here, without venturing into 
Heidegger’s distinction between zuhanden and vorhanden, it is already 
apparent that Heidegger is indicating that the beetle cannot conceive of 
the blade of grass creatively and beyond a limited utility. In the list 
Heidegger gives of the specific relationship “every animal as animal” has 
to “its prey, its enemies, its sexual mates, and so on”, the animal in 
Heidegger’s conception appears to be a creature of mere instinct, marching 
up and down a blade of grass. 
 Heidegger’s interest all along is man. Near the beginning of 
Chapter Four of The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
writes: 
In our existence as a whole we comport ourselves toward animals 
and in a certain manner toward plants too, in such a way that we 
are already aware of being transposed in a certain sense—in such a 
way that a certain possibility to go along with the beings concerned 
is already an unquestioned possibility for us from the start. (210) 
 
In Chapter Three, Heidegger had considered that the question that the 
essence of man is higher or lower than that of animals is  “questionable 
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even as a question” (194). It is now clearer that even though Heidegger 
does not want to take a hierarchical approach to the question of animals, 
his theories of the stone having no world, the animal being poor in world 
and man being world-forming are still hierarchical to the extent that in 
terms of the relations to “world” of these three categories he proposes, the 
difference in relation is not merely undifferentiated difference but a 
difference that places stone, plant and man on a scale, where stone has 
the least relation to world (none at all) and man the most. When 
Heidegger uses “our”, “we” and “us”, only human beings are included in 
this community. Only “we” are able to “comport ourselves toward animals” 
and “toward plants”. The “unquestioned possibility” is reserved “for us 
from the start” while the beetle continues to climb up and down its beetle-
thing.   
 To illustrate his example that humans comport themselves towards 
non-human animals uni-directionally, with no possibility of reversal, 
Heidegger turns to the example of the dog, a figure that will run through 
this dissertation. Heidegger’’s narrative of the dog is a tale about all dogs, 
about the dog as-such which has no access to the as-such. He writes: 
Let us consider the case of domestic animals as a striking example. 
We do not describe them as such simply because they turn up in the 
house but because they belong to the house, i.e., they serve the 
house in a certain sense. Yet they do not belong to the house in the 
way in which the roof belongs to the house as protection against 
storms. We keep domestic pets in the house with us, they ‘live with 
us’. But we do not live with them if living means: being in an animal 
kind of way. Yet we are with them nonetheless. But this being-with 
is not an existing-with, because a dog does not exist but merely 
lives.  Through this being with animals we enable them to move 
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within our world. We say that the dog is lying underneath the table 
or is running up the stairs and so on. Yet when we consider the dog 
itself—does it comport itself toward the table as table or toward the 
stairs as stairs? All the same, it does go up the stairs with us. It 
feeds with us—and yet, we do not really ‘feed’. It eats with us—and 
yet, it does not really ‘eat’. Nevertheless, it is with us! A going along 
with…, a transposedness, and yet not. (emphasis author’s, 210) 
 
It is this passage on the dog that reveals the paradoxical status of the 
animal’s world relation. The animal has but does not have world. The 
animal is with but not really with us. The animal transposes itself and yet 
not. The animal lives but does not exist. In this example, the idea of 
“world”, that Heidegger is still on his way towards elucidating, appears 
here as “our world”. Thus, when Heidegger says that domestic pets belong 
to the house, he actually means that they belong to us, to humans. There 
is an asymmetric power relation here: they “live with us” but we do not 
“live with them”. We “keep” them and we “enable them”, but only we exist, 
while they merely live. However, it would be too quick to merely condemn 
this passage for gross anthropocentrism. The space indicated by the 
ellipsis in Heidegger’s last sentence could be the significant gap with 
which the animal, since it cannot exist in Heidegger’s philosophy, finds its 
existence by moving through the gaps of the philosophy since within the 
limited sphere of the house, the animal has only a tenuous place. The 
hopefulness of the ellipsis in the last sentence arises from its hint at the 
difficulties that Heidegger’s thought seems to meet at this point in his 
attempt to draw lines between the animal and man. Heidegger might have 
wanted to claim Being for man, who alone can be Dasein unlike dogs who 
have no relation to beings as beings, to the stairs as stairs, but he cannot 
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seem to carry the thought through—the dog shadows the man up the 
stairs in this scene. At this point, though Heidegger makes the bold 
statement that “a dog does not exist”; he pauses after “A going along 
with...,” perhaps because he could not continue with the path of that 
thought and instead, concludes the thought with the hesitant “a 
transposedness and yet not”. What would have happened if he had gone 
along with that thought of the dog going along with? Would he have seen a 
face? Yet, in the scheme of the human writing above, the domesticated dog 
(and domestication is a fit metaphor here of housing the differences 
between even domesticated dogs into a neat category in order to make an 
example of them) does not even have a being. Non-human animals are 
without beings in the special sense of the word being, of being-there, of 
Dasein. In that sense, animals in Heidegerrian writing are ghostly 
creatures. A dog in his house is merely there, its life emptied out of 
existence. And there were never any dogs in Heidegger’s abode. 
 On 14 March 1987, Derrida presented at the CIPH conference titled 
"Heidegger: Open Questions" a lecture which later that year was 
published as Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. The first line of the 
lecture is “I shall speak of ghosts, of flame, and of ashes” (1). In it, Derrida 
addresses issues with the being of animals in Heidegger’s philosophy, 
since it is only Dasein, of which humans are the sole examples, who is 
privileged with a spiritual world that animals may only weakly participate 
in—like ghosts. In “Geschlecht II”, Derrida questions the philosophical 
crippling of animals in Heidegger’s philosophy within which, animals are 
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without hands as such. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Even when he is 
not literally addressing Heidegger’s zoo of confined creatures, Derrida 
responds to it. For example, In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger says: 
Man is the animal that confronts face-to-face. A mere animal, such 
as a dog, never confronts anything, it can never confront anything 
to its face; to do so, the animal would have to perceive itself. 
(emphasis author’s, 61) 
 
In contradistinction to Heidegger’s rejection of the animal’s ability to come 
face-to-face and Levinas’ ambivalence when confronted with the face of the 
snake, Derrida specifies in the opening of the lecture that his encounter 
with the gaze of his cat is a full-frontal encounter: 
Especially, I should make clear, if the cat observe me frontally 
naked, face to face, and if I am naked faced with the cat’s eyes 
looking at me from head to toe, as it were just to see, not hesitating 
to concentrate its vision—in order to see, with a view to seeing—in 
the direction of my sex. (emphasis author’s, 4) 
 
Haraway does not find it justified that “concentrated on his shame in 
being naked before his cat. Shame trumped curiosity.” For her, “shame is 
an inadequate response” (23). However, shame could be the most powerful 
response and not only representative of the shame of philosophy, naked in 
front of an animal’s gaze but shame could be the antidote needed for the 
pride of anthropocentric thinking. In Derrida’s bathroom encounter, it is 
not the animal that is the object of scrutiny. The cat returns the gaze and 
is capable not just of seeing but also of staring at the model for the 
phallus, putting phallogocentric and anthropocentric thinking to shame 
with its accusing stare.  
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Heidegger’s lizard, his beetle, his dog are given as universal 
examples for all animals as ahistorical beings with no age or gender. In 
the bathroom scene that Derrida describes, the animal not only has a face 
but this face is also marked by gender difference. Without a word, it can 
trigger a powerful response and who is to say this is not where language 
begins? The question that forms the title of the third chapter of The 
Animal that Therefore I Am, “And say the Animal Responded?”, is 
provocative as it is exactly the ability to “say” something, to respond, that 
has been almost unanimously denied to animals by humans. In “Dying 
Like a Dog in Great Expectations” Ivan Kreilkamp, referring to Derrida’s 
bathroom encounter with his cat, sees that “the gaze between a language-
less animal and a human being encapsulates the ethical and political 
problem of recognition and reciprocity” (85). However, “language-less 
animal” is precisely the assumption that Derrida’s depiction of the cat’s 
gaze challenges.  There is no reason why the gaze of a cat cannot too, be a 
response that is the beginning of language. Levinas famously suggested 
that language begins with the face-to-face. When Derrida’s cat looks at 
him in his nudity, two creatures come face-to-face. It is this language to-
come, that “we” must still learn to speak. Impossible as it may seem, it is 
crucial that this possibility remain open even if it means that this 
language is to be an indeterminable language without phrase. In the face-
to-face lie the possibilities of language that might never bring themselves 
to presence. The question is now no longer just if the animal can speak but 
also if our ears can hear the response if what is spoken are words to-come. 
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As Derrida asks, the question of whether the animal can respond is also 
the question of “whether one can know what respond means” (8). In §61 of 
The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics, which, although titled 
“Concluding delimitation of the essential concept of the organism” (xiv), 
acknowledges “The incompleteness of our present interpretation of the 
essence of the organism” (264). This admission of incompleteness, like the 
ellipsis in the passage on the domestic dog shows that Heidegger’s 
concepts of animals, though meant to be fundamental to metaphysics are 
not yet what they are supposed to be. There is still a path ahead and this 
path could lead elsewhere, to gigantic spaces beyond Heideggerian 
thought, to the elsewhere of spectral animals that can respond, can play, 
can return the gaze and can—exist.  
1.5 Forging paths with words to come: Ecce Animot 
 
  In The Animal that Therefore I Am, the neologism “animot” makes 
its appearance.  Animot is part of a long line of neologisms coined in 
Derrida’s career. Like “différance”, first introduced in “Cogito and the 
History of Madness”, animot is a self-reflexive, self-fissuring word. Firstly, 
animot, in speech, is homonymous with the French plural for animals, 
animaux. Derrida says outright that in this neologism, he “would like to 
have the plural animals heard in the singular” (47).  Why does the plural 
animaux not suffice? The word “animaux,” though plural, belongs to a 
system of concepts in a tainted language.  As Derrida says: 
Men would be first and foremost those living creatures who have 
given themselves the word that enables them to speak of the animal 
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with a single voice and to designate it as the single being that 
remains without a response, without a word with which to respond. 
(32) 
 
The subtitle of this dissertation, “words to come”, borrows Celan’s 
hope for a “word/ to come” in his poem “Todtnauberg” (314). This 
realization, need and desire for a word that will arrive and bring 
about justice, if only in poetry, is made all the more pertinent by 
Derrida’s insight into the condition of animals, animalized by the 
word “animal”, and thus left “without a word with which to 
respond” (314). Although written in a different context, Celan’s hope 
that a word could emerge out of a guilty silence and act as an 
apology that would bring about a rapprochement is resonant here. 
For example, the neologism “animot”, coined in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, is a self-referential, self-fissuring word that 
demands both careful reading and listening. Derrida’s neologism 
arises out of the recognition that the word “animal” has through its 
historical usage straitjacketed the multiplicity and possibilities of 
animals. Animot is thus, a word that casts doubt on words. How do 
we talk of animals if the word, whether singular or plural, is 
already tainted with the weighty burden of presuppositions as to 
how animals are defined? In response, Derrida attempts “to forge 
another word in the singular, at the same time close but radically 
foreign, a chimerical word” (41). In mythology, a chimera is a 
monstrous creature made up of the parts of multiple animals and in 
genetics, a chimera is a hybrid animal. To characterize animot as a 
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chimerical word is to say that the word itself is a monstrous hybrid 
animal. Animot is a word that questions and excavates the 
fantasies, metaphors and figurations obscured in the word “animal”. 
As self-referential, animot performs the often-hidden self-
referentiality of discourses on “the animal”. At the same time, as a 
non-word, animot substitutes for the absent word, for the ghostly 
absence in the word “animal”, showing that what it substitutes is a 
porous word. Animot can also be rearranged to form “I am not”. 
Animot, as a neologism, is not a synonymous substitute for 
“animals”. It is intended to be graphically less, retaining the 
remains of the old word, while opening up a space through the ears 
where, among other echoes, the English word “more”, the French 
word for word and the French plural for animals may be heard. The 
word animal cannot be an all-inclusive ark, the animals it claims to 
have onboard exceed and escape it.  
 Following the word animot does not lead to an escape from 
the word animal. The creation of the neologism is enabled by the old 
word that the new word appears to escape from. An estrangement 
from within, it is thus significant that “Ani” is not even a 
morpheme. These three letters, “ani”, violently torn away from what 
remains in the etymological traces of “animal”, “anima” and 
“animus”, graphically evoke the word “animal” while also resisting 
what is denoted by the complete word “animal”. The partial form of 
“Ani” when ripped from “animal” is a reminder that the word 
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“animal” belongs to a system of violence. It carries with it the heavy 
weight of a certain logic that has been heaped onto the word.  
To Derrida, animal is a guilty word. In the beginning was the word 
animal: 
That wrong was committed long ago and with long-term 
consequences. It derives from this word, or rather it comes together 
in this word animal, which men have given themselves as at the 
origin of humanity, and which they have given themselves in order 
to be identified, in order to be recognized, with a view to being what 
they say they are, namely, man, capable of responding and replying 
in the name of men.  (emphasis author’s, 32) 
 
With this singular word and what is presupposed by it, men have derived 
the sovereignty of men, as distinguished from the deprived bestiality of 
animals. Animot, is homonymous with the French plural for animals, 
animaux. Derrida says outright that in this neologism, he “would like to 
have the plural animals heard in the singular” (47). The plural “animals” 
or “animaux” is thus only a grammatical plural since the root word still 
designates a single concept, within which a multitude of beings are 
trapped. However, animot, as a neologism is not a synonymous substitute 
for “animals”. It is intended to be graphically less, retaining the remains of 
the old word, while opening up a space through the ears where the 
English word “more” and the French plural “animaux” may both be heard.  
The plural here goes beyond the recognition that the word “animals” has 
always contained within it a cramped plethora of animals. It is with the 
plural that justice begins. In “Force of Law”, Derrida writes that “the 
condition of all possible caring justice” would be “to address oneself to the 
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other in the language of the other” (246).  Even before the question of 
whether the other, an example of which could be a bird or a dog, has 
language, the question of how do I speak to this other, arises. The question 
is then not directed at the other as an alien externality that must be 
examined and qualified in terms of its abilities (Can it speak? Can it 
think? Can it suffer?) How might speaking begin? How do I speak to my 
dog, which is not even mine?  In the French language, it is not considered 
grammatical to say “Je parle à mon chien”. The preposition à in this 
context is reserved for “quelqu’un” or “someone”. Since “parler” is a verb 
that denotes interaction, the assumption behind the grammatical rule is 
that only someone, specifically human, can respond and animals do not 
fall into that category. Grammatically, it is only possible to be “quelqu’un” 
or “quelque chose”, “someone” or “something”. It is however grammatical 
to say “Je pense à mon chien” since the verb “pense”, which is to think, 
does not require the subject of thought to respond.  
Derrida’s neologisms are part of a struggle with the restrictions of 
grammar that imply larger restrictions of what is deemed acceptable or 
not. In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida’s speaks in one 
breathless sentence of his dream of a wholly new grammar with which all 
the presuppositions as to the categories of being, economies of sameness 
and binary oppositions between what is called “human” and “animal” may 
be swept away: 
In short, I was dreaming of inventing an unheard-of grammar and 
music in order to create a scene that was neither human, nor 
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divine, nor animal, with a view to denouncing all discourses on the 
so-called animal, all the anthropo-theomorphic or anthropo-
theocentric logics and axiomatic, philosophy, religion, politics, law, 
ethics, with a view to recognizing in them animal strategies, 
precisely, in the human sense of the term, strategems, ruses, and 
war machines, defensive or offensive maneuvers, search operations, 
predatory, seductive, indeed exterminatory operations as part of a 
pitiless struggle between what are presumed to be species.  (64) 
 
An echo of this whole new language to-come and its sound may be heard in 
a neologism like “animot”. Animot is not the manifestation of Derrida’s 
dream of this unheard-of grammar as, behaving like a noun, it is still 
structured by the conventional rules of grammar. In The World as Will 
and Representation, Schopenhauer says it is only music that is 
“independent of the phenomenal world” (257).  Derrida’s dream of this 
invented grammar that would not commit the same old sins is perhaps 
grammar as a music in the air of the almost tangible future. Animot may 
be read as a harbinger of these impossible words to-come, whether old or 
new, with which the relation between language, whether in its 
philosophical, artistic, religious, medical, legal or political manifestations 
may be rethought. In its multiplicities of meaning, animot dances on the 
edge of the possibility of the creation of such a grammar, non-
representational and beating to its own rhythm.  
When Derrida describes this new grammar, he says that he was 
dreaming. The metaphor of the dream might seem ineffective and even 
weak in the face of the long list of what his dream must achieve, which is 
to reject “philosophy, religion, politics, law, ethics” that are “stratagems, 
 26 
ruses and war machines” between what is known as species (64). In a 
similar vein, Werner Hamacher, in the last section of his essay “The Right 
to Have Rights (Four and a Half Remarks)”, titled “And a Half”, turns 
from discussing Aristotle’s Politics into Aristotle’s inquiry on language 
“peri hermenias”. He sees Aristotle’s identification of euché as an example 
of a non-apophantic logos, non-dependent on the opposition between truth 
and falsehood and thus non-falsifiable (355). To Hamacher, euché becomes 
an opening through language, performing its own hope and to be other 
than itself.  Euché in Hamacher’s explanation is the minimal word for 
possibility, for what may become and what may both “be” and “be 
otherwise”: 
Euché means prayer, plea, wish, claim, vow, also curse and 
malediction […] It is the language that claims something—for 
instance a right—that is not yet given; it is the lan- guage of a claim 
to a future that is not yet present and perhaps never will be. […] As 
euché it is the plea—or the prayer—for existence and even for its 
‘‘own’’ existence, and it is therefore itself not a being, but rather 
only the relation to its possibility. It is the medium and the 
happening of the existence with- out predicate as the happening of 
the possibility of such an existence. A plea that it may be a plea, 
and thus a plea without being that is made to an addressee without 
being—and only thus a right to have rights, a right to be and to be 
otherwise. (356) 
 
Animot behaves not unlike Hamacher’s reading of euché and it too is 
driven by its own euché. A bastard child of the word it never quite 
replaces, animot is a word that leaves itself open for what Hamacher calls 
the “addressee without being” or what Derrida calls the “arrivant”. 
 In Aporias, Derrida announces the arrivant as the visitor who is 
utterly unexpected: the stranger at home to whom we owe an infinite and 
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unconditional hospitality. Derrida’s deployment of the word arrivant may 
be distinguished from Levinas’ Autrui in that it is non-discriminatory. The 
arrivant may be monstrous because there is no telling the shapes, sizes, 
species and beings of the future addressees. In a way, Derrida is 
continuing Levinas’ project by extending his radical welcome of the other 
to the point where it is truly radical: by not excluding that which has been 
called “the animal”. Although Derrida maintains that he has “never 
believed in some homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man 
and what he calls the animal”, he is also careful to avoid the other extreme 
(emphasis author’s, 30). With regards to “man” and “the animal”, Derrida 
neither believes in “continuity” nor “discontinuity”. Without contradiction, 
he continues: 
There is no interest to be found in debating something like a 
discontinuity, rupture, or even abyss between those who call 
themselves men and what so-called men, those who name 
themselves men, call the animal. (30) 
 
At the same time that Derrida says there are distinctions between what 
are called humans and what are called animals, he also shows that it is 
impossible to distinguish between the two.  Throughout The Beast and the 
Sovereign and The Animal that Therefore I Am, Derrida shows the 
porosity of the lines drawn between what is called human and what is 
called the animal.  
One paragraph of The Animal That Therefore I Am begins with “It 
is a question of words, therefore”. Animot foregrounds not only the status 
of the word “animal” as word but it also raises the question of who the 
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word, “mot”, belongs to. Since, as Derrida says, “Animal is a word that 
men have given themselves the right to give”, the word becomes our 
inheritance, our inherited guilt (32). This word has also marred Western 
philosophies. Between a powerfully indicting set of parentheses, Derrida 
cites the names of philosophers “from Aristotle to Lacan, and including 
Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, and Levinas” who “say the same thing: the 
animal is deprived of language” (32). It is through the definition of 
language within human language that the non-human animal becomes 
deprived of language. In “Eating Well” Derrida says: 
The idea according to which man is the only speaking being, in its 
traditional form or in its Heideggerian form, seems to me at once 
undisplaceable and highly problematic. Of course, if one defines 
language in such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, 
what is there to say? But if one reinscribes language in a network of 
possibilities that do not merely encompass it but mark it irreducibly 
from the inside, everything changes. I am thinking in particular of 
the mark in general, of the trace, of iterability, of differance. These 
possibilities or necessities, without which there would be no 
language, are themselves not only human. (emphasis author’s, 285) 
 
In this interview, Derrida makes at least two important points. The 
question of whether non-human animals possess language prompts the 
question of what language is. If we can only define language as human 
language, what animals are deprived of would be human language. Yet, 
the conditions of possibilities for language are not the sole dominion of the 
human. The iterability of language is not an anthropocentric possibility. 
Although as a word, “animal” has human origins, it names an a priori 
principle that is non-dependent on humans. Iterability is already possible 
before the human and after the human. Before I have even written a word 
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and after I have written a word, before I was born and after I die, 
iterability must already be possible. Iterability is thus that which 
decentralizes humans from the language that we tend to like to call ours.  
In Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin, Derrida 
makes the paradoxical statement: “I only have one language; it is not 
mine” (1). This recognition is of tremendous importance to the question of 
the animal as the debate need no longer be about whether humans or non-
human animals have language. The question of whether animals have 
language has been asked along with many questions focusing on the 
abilities of animals. In The Animal That Therefore I Am Derrida cites 
Bentham’s utilitarian question as that which “changes everything”: “Can 
they suffer?” asks Bentham, simply yet profoundly (27). 
Derrida thinks that there is no doubt but a yes to the question (28). 
However, questions that are concerned with establishing oppositionalities 
or similarities between humans and non-human animals are immediately 
questionable. Enumerating differences and/or similarities between 
humans and non-human animals will not shake the categories of humans 
and non-human animals. The question of whether animals suffer does not 
go far enough into displacing the questions of whether animals can reason 
or have language. Bentham’s celebrated formulation, praised too by Peter 
Singer, begs the question of who or even what the word “they” refers to 
and even more crucially, who decides. 
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 The famous question is excerpted from Bentham’s 1789 work, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: 
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may 
acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from 
them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already 
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human 
being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a 
tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number 
of the legs, the villiosity of the skin, or the terminaton of the os 
sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive 
being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the 
inseparable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty 
of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a 
more rational, as well as a more conversable animal than any infant 
of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were 
otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can the talk? but, Can they suffer? (emphasis author’s, 
412) 
 
Bentham’s hope here is to formulate a utilitarian legal and moral code. 
Since utilitarianism deems an action moral if it increases the sum of 
happiness in a community and an action immoral if it decreases the 
overall sum of happiness in a community, Bentham suggests that the 
common ability of animals and humans to suffer should be the defining 
criteria for non-human animals to be included in the community of moral 
creatures. Though Bentham makes a persuasive case for this non-
anthropocentric community, there is a danger in the formulation of his 
question as it remains a question based on a judgment of abilities. Once 
there is the criteria with which to judge, the question of who judges arises. 
Though Derrida confidently answers “yes” to Bentham’s question, there is 
always the possibility of a “no”.   
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 In this dissertation, it is not non-human animals and their abilities 
or lack thereof that will be discussed but the paradoxical and hierarchical 
relations between humans and non-human animals as suggested by the 
coinage, Ecce Animot that Derrida makes in The Animal That Therefore I 
Am (41).  Ecce Animot displaces the biblical phrase in Latin “Ecce Homo.” 
The phrase, “Behold the Man”, in English, was uttered by Pontius Pilate 
during the trial of Jesus according to the Gospel of Saint John (19:5). By 
replacing “Homo” with “Animot”, Derrida makes the point that “Animot” 
substitutes for “Homo” because it is not possible to see the man without 
seeing the complexities and contradictions marked by the neologism 
“Animot”. It is thus not only the animal that is on trial in the question of 
the animal but the word animal named by man and thus, man is too on 














Chapter Two: Bobby’s Face Nowhere 
The fact that the human being can have the representation "I" raises him 
infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person....that 
is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as 
irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one's 
discretion.  
Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 
 
2.1 Introduction to “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” 
In “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights”, published in 1990 in Difficult 
Freedom and published originally in Celui qui ne peut pas se server des 
mots in 1976,  Levinas writes in the first person plural about a community 
of prisoners’ gratitude to a dog, who offered them hospitality while they 
were imprisoned in camp 1492 during Nazi Germany:: 
And then, about halfway through our long captivity, for a few short 
weeks, before the sentinels chased him away, a wandering dog 
entered our lives. One day he came to meet this rabble as we 
returned under guard from work. He survived in some wild patch in 
the region of the camp. But we called him Bobby, an exotic name, as 
one does with a cherished dog.  He would appear at morning 
assembly and was waiting for us as we returned, jumping up and 
down and barking in delight. For him, there was no doubt that we 
were men. (49) 
 
Earlier on in this essay that lies at the borders between philosophy, 
literature and auto-biography, Levinas exclaims that “There is 
transcendence in the animal!” (48). Yet, in an interview in his home, 
during the summer of 1986, titled “The Paradox of Morality”, Levinas is 
unable to say if a snake has a face and with regards to the face of the dog, 
he is ambivalent (169).  In Levinasian philosophy, the face-to-face relation 
is the originary metaphor for possibility of justice in the self-other 
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relation. The face of the other governs the self; the self is indebted to the 
face of the other. This face is beyond being and so, to be faceless is to be 
otherwise than beyond being, to be thrown into a non-place. Bobby’s 
liminal position in the essay illustrates the paradox of Levinasian 
morality with regards to the figure of the animal. The question of Bobby’s 
face, of whether the canine face has ethical status, haunts the very basis 
of Levinasian pure and proto-ethics; this vaguely present face is the 
blindspot from which the oeuvre needs to be reconsidered. The question of 
whether Bobby can be considered Autrui does not merely concern the 
realm of animal ethics or animals rights but places under suspicion the 
very face and possibility of Levinasian justice. How radical is the radical 
alterity of the other if the other may only be a human-like being? Though 
Levinas’ metaphor of the face is supposed to lack material content and 
does not take into account the color of the eyes or skin, by pausing when 
faced with the possibility of animal faces, Levinas reveals a bias that this 
face must be humanoid. The non-human animal is still ultimately 
displaced from the high place of the transcendental Autrui. However, in 
this essay Levinas shows a strong impulse to acknowledge the face of 
Bobby. Indeed, the autobiographical style of this essay reveals a sense 
that Levinas, as man and as philosopher, remains haunted by Bobby.  
2.2 We were Subhuman 
Levinas recounts the ordeal of imprisonment as a dehumanizing 
experience:  
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But the other men, called free, who had dealings with us or gave us 
work or orders or even a smile—and the children and women who 
passed by and sometimes raised their eyes—stripped us of our 
human skin. We were subhuman, a gang of apes. (152) 
 
It is not just physical violence but the abnegation of the ethical relation 
that constitutes the violence of camp 1492 in Levinas’ account. Even a 
passing smile from a free man causes the prisoners to feel “stripped” of 
their “human skin”. Likewise, the raised eyes of women or children gave 
rise to similar torture. The meeting of eyes between the prisoners and the 
free, without the offering of any hospitality, is a parody of Levinas’ 
premise of the ethical exigency intrinsic in the face-to-face relation 
between humans. The violence of the imagery Levinas uses to describe the 
blows given by passing smiles and raised eyebrows underlies the 
importance he places in the face-to-face relation as the basis of what 
makes humanity human—in the absence of which, they become 
“subhuman, a gang of apes”. His preconception of the relation between the 
human and non-human animal is revealed in the equating of “subhuman” 
with a “gang of apes”. Levinas, who places Autrui as higher than height, 
with the use of the prefix “sub”, renders the place of apes as hierarchically 
lower than that of the human animal.  
While Derrida experiences shame when a cat stares back at his 
naked body, Levinas and his fellow prisoners found reprieve from their 
shame caused by the gazes of other humans through the encounter with a 
stray dog. As prisoners, the men, having lost their human rights, no 
longer feel human but with the appearance of the dog, the men are 
 35 
reminded that, unlike Bobby, they are not yet animal. At a time when the 
prisoners were feeling like they were mere beasts, Bobby acts as the 
reminder that though they are mistreated as human beings, they were 
still close to the side of humanity and far from subhuman apes. Bobby is 
precisely valued because of his ability, to remind the captives that even if 
subhuman, they were not yet beastly. In Bobby’s eyes, Levinas reads that 
“For him, there was no doubt that we were men”. Firstly, Levinas assumes 
that Bobby’s welcome is attributed to the fact that the prisoners were 
humans. There is only “transcendence in the animal because”, in its 
difference, it attests to the humanity of men. For all Levinas’ exultation of 
the dog, there is still no possibility of the face-to-face relation that in 
Levinasian philosophy establishes ethics as first philosophy. Yet, ethics in 
Levinasian philosophy only allow humans ethical priority and non-human 
animals remain at the fringe of the ethical sphere. If Autrui, the non-
human face of the human other, is otherwise than being, then the non-
human animal other is without being within this scheme. It is precisely 
the denial of the non-human animal that elevates the status of the human 
animal. Throughout the essay, Levinas’ relation to Bobby remains one 
governed by the strict distinction between men and animal. Even though 
this essay of Levinas has been regarded as the only time he devotes his 
writing to the question of the animal, it remains, ultimately a denial of 
animal alterity, animal ethics and animal faces. Even as a stray dog, 
Bobby, according to Levinas, is playing the role of men’s best friend. 
However, might not Bobby’s welcome of the prisoners arise as a 
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Levinasian radical welcome of the radical other? Instead, in Levinas’ own 
reading, the non-human animal at this instance becomes the mere means 
by which the human animal finds his dignity as a human. Bobby, for all 
that his presence has done for the human creatures in the camp, is aligned 
closer to the side of “subhuman apes” and by the end of the essay, 
disappears into the forest where he came from, outside the boundary of 
the camp, which, for all its horrors, remains a human enclosure. 
2.3 Bobby: The Last Kantian Surviving in Some Wild Patch 
The reason Levinas provides for naming the dog Bobby is also of interest 
in revealing how Levinas wanted the dog to be different, but not too 
different. The name was chosen because it was “an exotic name”. In 
“Literature and the Right to Death”, Blanchot, following Hegel, makes the 
point that to “name the cat is, if you like, to make it into a non-cat, a cat 
that has ceased to exist” (325). Blanchot quotes Hegel on naming as 
killing: 
“Adam’s first act, which made him master of the animals, was to 
give them names, that is, he annihilated them in their existence (as 
existing creatures).” (323) 
 
Bobby, once given the gift of death, a name, ceases to be a living creature 
with nebulous possibilities but an idea. By naming Bobby, Levinas puts 
into operation the logic of the ghost, where Bobby is no longer attached to 
himself but has a name that will outlive him and be written about, years 
after. Who is Bobby? With the proper name, death is announced. Bobby is 
also the name conventionally given to human animals. Bobby, as a proper 
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name, is a word that does not discriminate. However, just like Bobby is 
Kantian and yet not Kantian, the name Bobby both humanizes Bobby and 
yet, as an exotic name, sets him apart from the other humans.  
The narrative of the encounter with Bobby is throughout 
circumscribed by the ambivalent position of Bobby. In the general 
economy of Levinasian philosophy, there is a persistent logic that the 
sovereignty of alterity is the distinction that gives humans their 
humanity, since it is from alterity that ipseity begins. Could Levinas not 
have taken the step beyond and accepted Bobby’s face as a mark of the 
radical alterity of the Other, as Autrui? Instead, the dog, though 
domesticated to an extent by being given the name “Bobby”, receives 
nothing in return. Levinas recounts that Bobby “survived in some wild 
patch” and after a few weeks was chased away by the guards (153). In the 
narrative, the elusive figure of Bobby is not unlike a spectral being who 
appears and disappears. Yet, the ghost of Bobby is not exorcised and 
lingers in Levinas’ thoughts, perhaps because when Levinas said that 
“There is transcendence in the animal”, he was himself not aware of how 
far that statement rings true: 
At the supreme hour of his institution, with neither ethics nor logos, 
the dog will attest to the dignity of its person. This is what the 
friend of man means. There is transcendence in the animal! (152) 
 
Even though Levinas was careful to avoid “taking the name of a dog in the 
figurative sense” and insisted that “a dog is a dog”, by the end of his essay, 
Bobby becomes a paradox, both a figure of singularity who has disappeared 
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into a forest and into the recesses of Levinas’ mind and at the same time, 
“the last Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to 
universalize maxims and drives” (153). Derrida’s skepticism about the 
status of Bobby in Levinas’ essay can be evinced from his reference in The 
Animal That Therefore I Am to “Levinas’ cursory remark about Bobby” (99). 
Derrida points out that in Levinas’ essay, the dog is not just a dog, but 
despite Levinas’ explicit statement otherwise, Bobby still becomes a figure. 
Derrida writes: 
this dog is but a figure for a Kantian dog, since he is lacking the 
essential thing that would be demanded by a Kantian morality that 
took into account the dignity (Würde) of a rational being capable of 
universalizing the maxims of his actions. (116) 
 
Levinas thus wants to read Bobby as the last Kantian, yet upon closer 
analysis, it is evident that Levinas would not accept that Bobby has what is 
required to be a truly Kantian being.  The meaning of Levinas’ enigmatic 
reference to Bobby as “the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany” has been 
debated by David L. Clark in “On Being ‘the Last Kantian in Nazi 
Germany’ ”. Clark notes the irony that: 
in qualifying his claim that Bobby is the “last Kantian in Nazi 
Germany” on the grounds that he lacks “the brains to universalize 
maxims and drives,” Levinas almost exactly reproduces Kant’s 
estimation of animals. (65) 
 
Kant has famously argued that animals are not moral creatures since they 
lack reason. Levinas follows in Kant’s footsteps when he asserts that Bobby 
has neither “ethics nor logos”. Yet, for Levinas, Bobby is still the last 
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Kantian in Nazi Germany. However, Bobby cannot be Kantian without 
having a face that commands the other. According to Kant, a man can have 
obligations only in a reciprocal manner to a being that has obligations and 
thus a dog can have no obligations. As John Llewellyn notes in “Am I 
Obsessed by Bobby?”: 
In the very human world of Immanuel Kant, the other man is the 
only being with whom I come face to face. So too in the very human 
world of Emmanuel Levinas. The only face we behold is the human 
face and that is the only face to which we are beholden. (237) 
 
Can the last Kantian be a faceless non-being? Bobby is thus a Kantian and 
Levinasian aporia. Levinas wants him to be Kantian, to be an exemplary 
figure of friendship in Nazi Germany and yet, denies him ethical status 
and logos. Levinas would prefer Bobby to be a brainless Kantian, 
transcendentally attesting to the “dignity of man” at a time of war when 
human ethics is put under vast pressure, without erasing the boundaries 
between man and “the animal”, as Levinas puts it. As a figure of 
consolation to rescue the inmates from despair at their inhumane 
treatment and to remind them of not just their humanity but the 
humanity of mankind, Bobby steps into the place of the “last Kantian”, to 
shore up the ruins of Nazi Germany. Why last? The “Kantian” aspect of 
the sentence has been analyzed to a great extent but it is also significant 
that Bobby is the last remaining Kantian and that the last Kantian in 
Nazi Germany turns out to be an animal that is deemed both brainless 
and speechless. Beyond the irony in associating Bobby with Kant, in being 
the last Kantian, Bobby becomes the figure of singularity and 
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impossibility running across the neat categories that Kant, and Levinas 
following him, assigned between the animal and humans. This is Bobby’s 
revenge.  
 By seeing Bobby as the last Kantian, in a horrific time when the 
existence of ethics comes under great suspicion, beyond his intention, 
Levinas chances upon the possibility that the last Kantian would be 
precisely neither wholly human nor wholly animal but instead, inhabit a 
strange space in between—between the space of the camp and that of the 
forest, between bodily existence as a real dog and figurative existence in 
Levinas’ memory and narrative as a symbol of what it/he cannot rightfully 
be. 
Bobby is indeed a figure of transcendence as Levinas himself notes 
but what he transcends is in excess of what Levinas might have thought 
possible. As a figure of transcendence, he is as enigmatic as the 
Levinasian Autrui. Rather than being from a position of transcendental 
height, Bobby could be read as Autrui positioned on a level 
transcendentally low, earthily beyond understanding. Levinas himself 
recognizes the difficulty of thinking of Bobby as a creature whose meaning 
can be assigned by men when, before Bobby‘s crowning as the “last 
Kantian”, he briefly contemplates the idea of Ulysses’ dog, Argus as a 
forebear of Bobby. This thought however, is quickly denied by Levinas 
with a vehement “But no, no!” (153). His thoughts return to the silent 
biblical dogs, acting as witnesses for men, that his essay opens with. In it, 
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Levinas tells us of “the debt that is always open” (152). But to whom or 
what then is this debt owed? Bobby’s status in the essay is unclear and 
though the essay title begins with “The name of a dog”, Bobby’s name 
appears only in the first and penultimate paragraph. Does Bobby, in his 
supposed faith in humanity, continuing his forefather’s services to 
humanity as silent witnesses, and yet denied face-hood become the ghost 
of Levinasian morality?  
2.4 Paradoxes of Morality 
In 1986, a decade after the essay was first published, Levinas gave 
an interview with Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley titled 
“The Paradox of Morality”. One of the exchanges is highly significant to 
the present discussion: 
But is there something distinctive about the human face which for 
example, sets it apart from that of an animal? 
One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal. It is via the face 
that one understands, for example, a dog. Yet the priority here is 
not found in the animal, but in the human face. We understand the 
animal, the face of an animal, in accordance with Dasein. The 
phenomenon of the face is not in its purest form in the dog. In the 
dog, in the animal, there are other phenomena. For example, the 
force of nature is pure vitality. It is more this which characterizes 
the dog. But it also has a face.  
There are these two strange things in the face: its extreme 
frailty—the fact of being without means and, on the other hand, 
there is authority. It is as if God spoke through the face. (169) 
 
In Levinas’ response, it seems like there is hope in Levinas’ refusal to 
completely reject the face of an animal. However, Levinas’ use of “cannot 
entirely refuse” amounts to, at most, a bizarre half-acceptance. Even 
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though Levinas, perhaps even on account of Bobby, accepts that the dog 
“also has a face”, this generosity on his part is already qualified with the 
statements that “priority here is not found in the animal, but in the 
human face” and even more devastatingly, “The phenomenon of the face is 
not in its purest form in the dog”. Such qualifications render the face of 
the dog as an impure face that ranks beneath the transcendental face of 
the human. There is transcendence in the dog, Levinas says. Here he 
seems to add silently: but not with a face.  
In the same interview, Levinas says that the face is what speaks: 
I think that the beginning of language is in the face. In a certain 
way, in its silence, it calls you. Your reaction to the face is a 
response. Not just a response, but a responsibility. (169) 
 
If language begins in the face and the face is what calls for justice, for a 
response that is responsibility, then what sort of language, and 
correspondingly, justice, is granted to an impure face? Why then are 
Bobby’s forefathers on the Nile silent? How do we and how dare we speak 
to Bobby, if at all possible? By Levinasian logic, if the dog has face, then it 
has at least a chance at language and if we can speak to dogs, then we 
have obligations towards them. However, the possibility of Bobby having 
speech is further complicated by Levinas’ insistence on drawing a clear 
boundary between humans and animals. Levinas further explains in the 
interview that the face of the dog is not only impure but is also completely 
different from that of “the human”: 
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I cannot say at what moment you have the right to be called ‘face’. 
The human face is completely different and only afterwards do we 
discover the face of an animal. I don’t know if a snake has a face. I 
can’t answer that question. A more specific analysis is needed. (172) 
 
Much has been made of Levinas’ hesitation when it comes to the face of 
the snake. Clark criticizes Levinas for being unable to say “either ‘yes’ or 
‘no” to the question of whether a snake has a face. For Clark, “When 
Levinas turns his mind to an animal other than a dog, he falters” (57). The 
special status dogs receive in Levinas’ philosophy as pointed out by Clark 
is indeed an interesting inconsistency. The imprint of Bobby’s face on the 
philosopher’s memory has created a hierarchy of faces, with the alterity 
inspired by the human face on top, followed by the impure face of dogs and 
the deferred faces of snakes. Levinas’ faltering could even be the clearing 
with which his philosophy at least acknowledges the plurality of animals. 
At the very least, even though he uses the singular, Levinas clearly 
distinguishes between the face of the dog and the unknown status of the 
face of the snake. Furthermore, in Levinas’ reminiscences of Bobby, he 
states his intention to present Bobby as a literal autobiographical 
experience with a singular creature, and struggles, though unsuccessfully, 
to refrain from allegorizing this singular dog. Even though Levinas never 
explicitly accepts a non-human animal as an Autrui and in many ways, 
seems to be directly against such a possibility, he does not explicitly reject 
the idea either. The mere fact that the dog and the snake in Levinasian 
thought do not immediately present the same face or facelessness already 
shows that the dog is clearly a different animal from the snake in terms of 
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ethical status. Though this could be seen as an irrational prejudice against 
the snake, Levinas is at least, willingly or not, showing a move away from 
a monolithic conception of “the animal”, even though he still uses that 
term. By readily accepting a different, albeit impure face for the dog, and 
abstaining from commenting on the face of the snake, Levinas accepts that 
“the animal face” is not only different from humans, but also different 
from itself, and thus, there cannot be just one singular face for all animals 
but multiple faces, and at the same time, each face is still a singularity.  
 This allowance for animals to have plural faces is the possibility 
embedded within Levinas’ ambiguation with regards to faces of animals. 
However, in Levinasian philosophy, the human face comes first, followed 
by the dirty face of the dog and then the mysterious face/facelessness of 
the snake. The dog’s priority over the snake is due to its resemblance in 
actions to human beings and more specifically, the child:  
Children are often loved for their animality. The child is not 
suspicious of anything. He jumps, he walks, he bites. It’s delightful. 
(172) 
A dog, innocent and full of amusing actions, even when full-grown 
becomes the image of an eternal childlike creature in a perpetual, and 
ideal childhood. Levinas also conjectures that “In the dog, what we like is 
perhaps his child-like character” (172). At its heart then, even when 
Levinas says the face of the animal is different from that of humans, that 
face remains human-like. Only because it is human-like does the dog have 
(human-seeming) faces. It is a creature of vitality and action, with the 
heat of the heart but nothing more beyond. In the close association 
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between the child and the dog Levinas makes, both figures are non-
threatening, entertaining and also mentally vacuous. The child and the 
dog are full of “delightful” actions but seem to have few, if any, thoughts. 
What, a moment ago in the interview, seems like the face of a dog finally 
surfacing, fades now into Bobby’s ghostly face; a monstrous creature, now 
a child, is chased into the woods, disappearing. 
Yet, it is Levinas’ failure to reciprocate Bobby’s gift of hospitality 
that makes Bobby even more fitting as Levinasian Autrui. Simon 
Critchley comments in The Ethics of Deconstruction that Levinas’ 
philosophy is one of “radical generosity” (111). This generosity is, however, 
of a restricted sphere and does not radically extend to the non-human. 
Levinas could not give to Bobby as much as Bobby seems to have given to 
him. Within Levinas’ essay, Bobby’s actions displayed a radically generous 
welcome to the frail and poor prisoners who needed that welcome. Within 
the same interview Levinas vacillates over the status of the face of 
animals, Levinas emphasizes, as he often does throughout his work, that 
the face of the Autrui begins from “the idea of extreme frailty, of demand, 
that the other is poor” (170). It is indeed a paradox of Levinasian morality 
that nowhere is the other more in need, more frail and in greater poverty 
than animals in philosophies such as that of Levinas. Yet, in their position 
of extreme need, though they have substituted for men in rituals and 
sacrifices, whether physically or symbolically, from Mount Moriah to camp 
1492, as sacrificial sheep or “subhuman apes”, animals remain de-faced. 
Levinas has never given an argument as to whether a snake has a face but 
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avoids the question. When Levinas says that he “cannot say whether a 
snake has a face”, he is also saying that he would rather not face up to 
that face, if it is to be or to-come.  
Though Levinas might not have accepted it, within his philosophy, 
animals, made destitute by Western philosophies such as his, have faces. 
In Levinasian thought, selfhood and the other are inextricably linked and 
it is in the strictly impossible relationship with Autrui, that the self, is 
burdened with an absolute responsibility, “over and above what he 
experiences” (“Substitution” 93). Levinas calls this a “traumatism of 
responsibility and not causality” (“Substitution” 94). The self is an effect of 
this relation, which is a non-relation between the creature and the other. 
If height assumes measurable, traversable distance, then Autrui is 
transcendentally high, and is placed in a beyond, beyond ontology, beyond 
conceptual understanding, and cannot be reached. The creature, in arche-
passivity, is the hostage, while “The Other is the end” (“Substitution” 94). 
(Here lies the ghostly faces of animals, held hostage to their human others 
for so long). The self, marked by Autrui is not born with original sin but 
with pre-originary guilt for all that he has not done. For Levinas, the 
“birth of the Ego in a gnawing remorse” is “the absolute recurrence of 
substitution” (“Substitution” 93). The Autrui requires “an unconditional 
Yes” even as it condemns and persecutes the self (“Substitution” 93). The 
self, merely by existing, is obliged to sacrifice endlessly. (Here lies the 
ghostly face of the biblical sheep that was sacrificed in place of Isaac and 
behind it, faces of the countless number of animals that have been 
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sacrificed after it for the supposedly non-human but actually humanoid 
Autrui).  
Even though Levinas has the human in mind, the impossible 
structure with which he described the relation between self and other was 
intended to be beyond being, and thus cannot be restricted to a human 
relation. This non-ontological subjectivity in the Levinasian account does 
not begin with the self but through the other, and our obligation to 
proximity with the other is “an anteriority that is older than the a priori” 
(“Enigma and Phenomenon” 81). Modifying Heidegger, it is not death that 
is the impossible to-come but this passivity of sacrifice that is “an 
impossibility anterior to this possibility” (“Substitution” 94).  This 
impossibility is what makes the susceptible self possible. Before any event, 
Autrui who is my inaccessible sovereign and at the same time has utter 
need for me leaves a trace in the face of the others, other creatures (need 
they only be human?), equally prostrating before the other. 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida notes that in 
Levinasian philosophy:  
The animal has no face, he does not have the naked face that looks 
at me to the extent of my forgetting the color of its eyes. The word 
nudity, which is used so frequently, which is so indispensable for 
Levinas in describing the face, skin, and vulnerability of the other 
or of my relation to the other, of my responsibility for the other 
when I say “here I am,” never concerns nudity in its sexual 
difference and never appears within the field of my relation to the 
animal. The animal has neither face nor skin in the sense Levinas 
has taught us to give to those words. (emphasis author’s, 107) 
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In the light of his critique of Levinasian nudity as restricted to the human 
relation, Derrida’s own emphasis on his nudity in relation to the gaze of 
his cat in The Animal That Therefore I Am takes on greater significance. 
Beyond the insistence on the body of the philosopher, Derrida could be 
hinting that the non-physical, non-ontological nudity that governs ethical 
relation in Levinas is also possible in the non-human animal and human 
animal relation. It must be possible because what is otherwise than being 
cannot justly exclude the non-human being. If not, Levinas’ attempt to 
think beyond ontology would remain stuck in the realm of the human and 
produce a mockery of the beyond being that is actually still enclosed 
within the human sphere.  
Levinas’ inability to expand the realm of alterity has been discussed 
by various critics. In “Ethical Cynicism”, Peter Atterton notes: 
Even though he did not completely refuse the face of an animal, and 
even presented Bobby, a dog, as something of a moral exemplar for 
humans, he persistently pulled on the reins of his discussion as 
soon as it appeared to him that the animal question was 
threatening to take priority away from the human. (61) 
 
Atterton’s criticism continues and in his opinion, despite presenting Bobby 
as “something of a moral exemplar for humans” Levinas has failed to learn 
a key lesson from Bobby: 
The lesson he should perhaps have learnt was that his ethical 
theory was perhaps the best equipped of all the theories—with the 
exception of utilitarianism—to accommodate the inclusion of the 
other animal, and thereby truly go beyond the very humanism—and 
human chauvinism—that has served as a philosophical justification 
for the mistreatment of animals for over two millennia. (61) 
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Despite the apparent valorization of Bobby in Levinas’ only essay that 
deals directly with the question of the animal, Levinas never gives the 
non-human animal the same ethical consideration as the human animal. 
What is conventionally called the human cannot be human all by itself 
and is already not yet human until it is part of a community that includes 
what is conventionally called “animals”. This would require going beyond 
the recognition of animality in humans or moments of humanity in 
animals as that would be presupposing that certain qualities are already 
human or animal to reach the point where animality and humanity no 
longer masquerade as concepts with which to distinguish the human 
animal as the sovereign being.  
On the one hand, Levinasian philosophy holds great promise in 
thinking animals as Autrui and is the chance with which animals can be 
radically thought of as not coming before or after the atomistic human 
being but part of the formation of selfhood. On the other hand, Autrui’s 
place in Levinasian philosophy will be drastically different if within it, 
animals have the status of Autrui. More than just a matter of expanding 
the umbrella of the term, the locus of Autrui would shift. Can it still be at 
that transcendental and sovereign height if it included all the beasts 
traditionally considered as lowly? Levinas’ turning away from the question 
of the animal is not merely an oversight on his part. From the essay on 
Bobby, it is at least clear that Levinas did not merely forget about animals 
when he developed his ideas. Why is it that even though he remembered 
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animals and his singular encounter with Bobby, Levinas could not 
consider animals unhesitatingly as Autrui? 
2.5 Bobby’s Face—Autrui? 
Following the surge in studies on the question of the animal, there 
has been renewed interest in Bobby’s place within Levinas’ philosophy. 
However, John Llewelyn and David L. Clark’s commentaries remain 
important points of reference. Both Llewelyn and Clark agree that Bobby 
allows for a rethinking of the relation between animals, speech and their 
ethical status but the questions they ask lead them in significantly 
different directions. While Clark’s questions can be read as an opening in 
rethinking animals, Llewelyn’s questions, while well-meaning, comes 
dangerously close to supporting the silencing of animals.  
Llewelyn asks: 
But why must responsibility be limited to responding to a being 
that has the gift of speech? Why can we not allow an ethical 
responsibility to dumb animals? (240) 
 
Llewelyn goes on to invoke the famous Bentham formulation that “the 
question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer” 
(240)? At this point, Llewelyn’s aim is to shift the debate to focus on 
human obligations to sentient beings that suffer and it is to this end that 
he invokes Bentham. However, though the acknowledgement that animals 
can suffer is important, it is also not sufficient. As long as the bias 
remains that speech belongs only to humans, Bobby remains silenced; the 
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possibilities of languages, being in excess of human speeches, which, (as 
Derrida implies in Monolingualism of the Other), are also not human in 
the first place, become foreclosed. The question of whether humans should 
allow ethical responsibility to dumb animals begs the questions of why 
these animals are considered dumb in the first place and why is it that 
humans have the right to decide for all and for all time. If humans define 
speech as human speech, then of course, non-human animals do not have 
speech. Even though Llewelyn is in no way actively affirming the 
superiority of humankind who has language, but is instead questioning 
human language, his concluding words can be read, disappointingly, as a 
passive acceptance that Bobby cannot be Autrui. He abandons the 
question of whether animals can be Autrui and instead looks at the place 
of the human in Levinasian ethics and on whether in the face-to-face, 
anything can be said between humans: 
Even if Levinas’s ethics cannot be an ethics of the other animal, 
even if Bobby cannot be my neighbor according to that ethics, we 
must take him seriously when he insists that the ethics of which he 
speaks is a humanism of the other man. This means that we must 
now ask how in the face-to-face the other man can say anything at 
all and how, without the constraints imposed by the importation of 
commandments from positive religions, he can be prevented from 
saying anything whatsoever. (emphasis author’s, 244) 
 
But why not? Must it be that Bobby cannot be my neighbor according to 
Levinasian ethics? This is perhaps the question that Llewelyn neglects to 
interrogate Levinas with. Is there a way to move beyond the Humanism of 
the Other man to a more-inclusive phrase, perhaps, the otherness of the 
other?  
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In contrast to Llewelyn’s acceptance of Levinas’ dichotomy, Clark 
seizes the opportunity to question the boundaries by which human speech 
is defined and how these have been fences for cordoning off humans from 
non-human animals: 
What then is the logos that it cannot account for Bobby’s languages, 
and for the multiplication of languages and the differences between 
languages across the oppositional limit dividing human from 
animal? Language is the implacable human standard against which 
the animal is measured and always found wanting; but what if the 
“animal” were to become the site of an excess against which one 
might measure the prescriptive, exclusionary force of the logos, the 
ways in which the truth of the rational word muffles, strangles, and 
finally silences the animal? (67)  
 
The obligation Bobby demands, in Levinas’ words, the debt that is always 
open, is precisely to reconsider the definitions that have opposed humans 
to non-human animals; to ask again, where the “we” begins; rather than 
assuming that non-human animals do not have merely because they do 
not exhibit signs of speech according to human criteria. So perhaps, 
Bobby’s “friendly growling” was not “born from the silence of his 
forefathers on the banks of the Nile” as the final sentence in Levinas’ 
essay goes, but is rather born out of the silencing of his forefathers on the 
banks of the Nile.  
2.6 A Face with which to Speak 
What holds Levinas, along with many other philosophers back, is 
the stubborn notion that language is the exclusive domain of human 
beings and that by which human can be distinguished from lesser 
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creatures. Within Levinasian philosophy, the assumption that animals are 
without language is a key reason why they cannot then have faces. Yet, 
the ghostly animal face that resides in Levinas’ assumptions about 
language is also the weak point of his philosophy. In Totality and Infinity, 
Levinas shows us that it is Autrui’s eyes that speak/write justice since 
“the third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other—language is justice” 
(213). Though there can be no comprehension of this non-human, non-
object alterity, by remaining in its state of radical difference and 
disclosing itself in the face of Autrui, alterity enables the possibility of 
justice. For Levinas, the justice of language and the language of justice is 
the hoped-for common ground that can lead to a just relation between the 
one and the other. In Levinasian logic, it is the injustice of the pre-
temporal relation that calls out for justice in the relation between others. 
In the face-to-face relation, it is the meontological face of non-being that 
gives rise to the epiphany of ethical relation. The expression of the face of 
Autrui and its simultaneous poverty and height is what elicits justice and 
only afterwards do questions of morality arise.  
In a 1988 interview titled “Responsibility and Substitution”, 
Levinas clarifies that: 
For me, the notion of substitution is tied to the notion of 
responsibility […] it is to bear his weight while sacrificing one’s 
interestedness and complacency-in-being, which then turn into 
responsibility for the other. (228) 
 
Substitution is a key tenet of Levinas’ thought of the humanism of the 
other. Yet, this is not an advocation of sacrifice since substitution is not a 
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choice that is made after the fact of selfhood but selfhood is not possible 
without substitution. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas shows that “the 
other is in me and in the midst of my very identification” (125). This does 
not reduce the other to the same since the relation between the self and 
the other, though intertwined is still that of a face-to-face. Combining 
Levinas’ clarification in Otherwise than Being, that the other is not a 
distant figure that comes after the self, with his famous lines in Totality 
and Infinity that “The epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity” 
(213), it becomes clear that the language of the face Levinas refers to is 
not speaking or writing in the human ways we have come to understand 
language to be. The response the face demands is necessarily beyond 
human expression since the face is, from its beginnings, rooted in the face 
of the otherworldly Autrui. If the other can be the animal other, then there 
is no reason why Autrui, the epiphany of the face-to-face and the language 
of that face, needs to remain limitedly humanized. 
In “Violence and Metaphysics”, Derrida warns of the purity of the 
language with which Levinas demands justice. Derrida asks if it is only 
with perfectly divine speech that Autrui speaks: 
It is only in God, that speech as presence, as the origin or horizon of 
writing, is realized without defect. (102) 
 
Derrida further warns that “Levinas’ thought would not only propose an 
ethics without law”, but would also depend on “a language without 
phrase” (148). In Derrida’s analysis, entering into language entails a level 
of violence, if violence is determined “as the necessity that the other does 
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not appear as what it is” (133). In language, violence is done to alterity. By 
wanting the other to preserve its alterity through remaining non-
conceptual, Levinas is imagining a language purified of rhetoric. For 
Derrida, Levinas is mistaken in imagining a nonviolent language not 
dependent on the concept and like Autrui, is beyond being. Derrida insists 
that the purity of its “silent intention”, would not be language but a realm 
of nonsense (148). It will not enter into time, into history and will not be 
the language of humanity. This desire for pure nonviolence would, 
ironically, be worse than violence, since abnegating language will mean a 
condemnation to silence.  
The revised version of “Violence and Metaphysics” was published in 
the 1967 collection of essays translated as Writing and Difference. When 
Levinas published Otherwise than Being in 1974, he responded to 
Derrida’s critique, particularly in the fourth section of the work, 
“Substitution”, where he clarified his thoughts on the saying and the said. 
However, not all of Derrida’s critique of Levinas was answered. In 
“Violence and Metaphysics”, Derrida had already noted that, like its 
divine language, Levinas’ face is meant to be closer to that of God’s than 
animals: 
But is the analogy between the face and God’s visage that, in the 
most classical fashion, distinguishes man from animal, and 
determines man’s substantiality:  “The Other resembles God.” 
Man’s substantiality, which permits him to be face, is thus founded 
in his resemblance to God. (142) 
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Even if Bobby had language, he would not be Autrui as it is man’s 
substantiality that allows him not merely to have but be face. However, 
Derrida’s intervention at this point shows that though Levinas is 
concerned only with humanism, the language and face he speaks of is 
actually non-human.  
Elsewhere in his work, even when he is not referring directly to 
Levinas, Derrida shatters the assumption that humans have language and 
animals do not by showing that what is frequently called human language 
is an enigma in the first place that does not easily belong to us. It is not 
only animals who cannot prove that they own language. Even that which 
we call language is not necessarily ours. As Derrida develops later on in 
Monolingualism of the Other: 
that in any case we speak only one language—and that we do not 
own it. We only ever speak one language—and, since it returns to 
the other, it exists asymmetrically, always for the other, from the 
other, kept by the other. Coming from the other, remaining with the 
other, and returning to the other. (emphasis author’s, 40) 
 
In this case, the other, to whom language belongs, is not any singular 
other and certainly, not any human other but an otherness within 
language itself that ruptures it away from our command. The conditions of 
possibility that allow for our ability to write have never been unique to 
human beings. Non-human animals are governed by the same conditions 
of iterability. In an interview with Elizabeth Roudinesco, titled “Violence 
Against Animals” in For What Tomorrow, Derrida calls attention to Of 
Grammatology: 
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Beginning with Of Grammatology, the elaboration of a new concept 
of the trace had to be extended to the entire field of the living, or 
rather to the life/death relation, beyond the anthropological limits of 
“spoken” language (or “written” language, in the ordinary sense), 
beyond the phonocentrism or the logocentrism that always trusts in 
a simple and oppositional limit between Man and the Animal. 
(emphasis author’s, 63) 
 
Derrida writes, in Of Grammatology: 
Even before being determined as human (with all the distinctive 
characteristics that have always been attributed to man and the 
entire system of significations that they imply) or nonhuman, the 
grammè—or the grapheme—would thus name the element. (9) 
 
The questions of whether animals can speak and write can thus be asked 
again as in the form: can writing write animals? The force of writing, its 
conditions and its relationship with the trace do not only apply to animals 
and thus, language has always been the prerogative of animals and their 
possible futures. Just like the inclusion of animals within the boundaries 
of Autrui would cause tremours within Levinasian philosophy once the 
basis of the systematic exclusion within the philosophy is excavated, the 
restricted sphere of human language will be challenged by the possibilities 
of language belonging to all and to none as such.  This is the work that has 
to be done. 
Though it remains to be seen, Bobby’s face is never completely 
absent. Perhaps it is a secret face, or a ghostly face, resulting from the 
effacement of animal faces from too much of Western philosophies. It 
would not do to dismiss Levinasian philosophy simply because it is guilty 
of turning away from animal faces, as in so doing, the chance with which 
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to open the space in Levinasian thought for the event of the animal would 
have been missed. Levinas’ philosophy of ethics could have allowed for the 
face of Bobby. In fact, by not giving due consideration to Bobby’s face and 
never speaking or writing again on the face of the snake, Levinas’ 
philosophy remains haunted by the faces of these animals. Thus, Levinas’ 
line “I am thinking of Bobby” resonates and reverberates. The notion of 
responsibility for the other would not suffer from becoming the notion of 
responsibility for the (animal) other, even if this face is to be an 
ectoplasmic face grafted like a ghost conjured in a séance of Levinas’ 
writings.  
2.7 A Snake with a Face 
On February 27, 2002, as part of the ninth session of the lectures 
published as The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida turns to D.H. 
Lawrence’s poem “Snake” to answer the question “Can you say of the 
animal what you say of man in his ethical dimension?”, a question which, 
as Derrida, puts it, Levinas “sent back to a questioner” (237). Derrida 
locates within Lawrence’s poem the Levinasian dilemma of hospitality.   
From the lines “Someone was before me at my water-trough, /And I, 
like a second comer, waiting” Derrida finds the Levinasian code of 
hospitality (282). Since, in Levinasian ethics, the other always comes 
before the self and the self becomes itself in its relation to the other, it is 
with an “After you” that ethics and hospitality begins. In this instance, it 
is a matter of timing, the snake has arrived at the water trough before the 
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speaker but Derrida points out “I am the one who comes afterward, not 
the one who happens to have come second” (239). Coming afterwards is 
the condition of hospitality, of giving place to the other as the first, who 
will always come before. However the ethical imperative demanded by the 
face is put under pressure when the self and its sovereignty is threatened. 
The guest can always be a murderer. In Levinasian ethics, morality is the 
right to give hospitality not to receive it: there is no guarantee of 
reciprocal hospitality. In fact, the relation with Autrui, is meant to be 
asymmetrical. Only the self is obliged to give to the other and may not 
command the other to give in return. Now, a venomous golden snake is 
infringing on the speaker’s territory and he retains the possessive “my” to 
refer to his water-trough, the speaker hears voices to command him to 
action. Voices in him say: “If you were a man/ You would take a stick and 
break him now, and finish him off” (283). This is the carnophallogocentric 
hypothesis with which manhood begins: if you were a man, you would kill 
the other. However, the speaker is aware that he is bound by the rules of 
hospitality and, like a Levinasian who allows for the face of the snake, 
who sees the snake as “someone”, says, “How glad I was he had come like 
a guest in quiet, to drink at my/ water-trough” and “But even so, honoured 
still more/ That he should seek my hospitality” (283). Similar to Derrida’s 
feelings at being naked in front of the staring eyes of his cat, the speaker 
experiences curiosity and shame in encountering the snake who “looked” 
at him: “Was it cowardice, that I dare not kill him? / Was it perversity, 
that I longed to talk to him? Was it humility to feel so honoured?” (283). In 
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response to the second question, Derrida sees the desire to talk to the 
snake, as someone desiring to talk to someone else. Without even asking 
the question of how to talk to the snake, with what language, the desire to 
do so is already important: “the many voices he hears in him, his first 
desire, the one who loves the snake, is to talk to him” (241). The speaker, 
as host feels honoured and also threatened by the presence of the self-
invited guest. This encounter leaves him in an aporia of shame. If he does 
not kill the guest, his sense of manhood and humanity is under threat. If 
he kills the guest, his right and responsibility to give hospitality will be 
betrayed. Derrida’s shame at being exposed naked in front of his cat 
replays here: the nudity and vulnerability of the snake’s face reveals the 
double bind the speaker finds himself in. It is thus significant that once 
the snake turns its head and is already retreating into a “black hole”, the 
speaker loses sight of the face of the snake. He can no longer restrain 
himself from picking up a weapon to throw at what remains of the body of 
the snake— the snake that has already begun, quietly and peacefully, 
retreating into a black hole. Significantly, it is not the moment that the 
speaker feels the most threatened that the weapon is hurled but the 
moment when the face-to-face encounter ends that the speaker is 
overtaken by “the voices of my accursed human education” (282). Earlier 
in the poem, the speaker attributes the command to kill to the voice of his 
education, this time round, he specifies that it is his “human education” 
that has led up to the moment he instantaneously regrets. It is his 
humanity that causes his murderous act. Even though he does not think 
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the log hit the snake, the speaker is aware that his seemingly rash action 
is the culmination of learning to be human. From the time in the bible 
when the reward of faith is a sheep sacrificed in place of a son, “accursed 
human education” has elevated humanity by having animals fall from 
below. 
Not unlike Levinas’ inability to forget Bobby, Lawrence’s speaker 
cannot forget his snake and the snake becomes the sovereign in the 
penultimate stanza of the poem: “For he seemed to me again like a king, / 
Like a king in exile, uncrowned in the underworld, / Now due to be 
crowned again” (284). The crown, placed on the head, emphasizes and 
illuminates the face of the snake. The face of the snake is due to be 
recognized and seen again. After having erred in following his “human 
education”, the man as murderer recalls another tale of guilt with regards 
to an animal, and, in a reference to Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner”, says, “I thought of the albatross, / And I wish he would come 
back, my snake” (284).  While previously it is the water-trough that is 
referred to with the possessive “my”, now, for the first and only time in the 
poem, the snake is “my snake”. The snake’s bond with the speaker begins 
at the moment when the speaker attacks and regrets this attack on the 
snake because it is only in breaking the code of hospitality that he realizes 
that it is his responsibility to be hospitable that binds him to the other, so 
that the other is mine, my responsibility. This poem dramatizes the 
difficulties and also the necessities of being hospitable to the other: it is in 
fear, honour, regret and shame that the speaker realizes the importance of 
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the face-to-face with the snake. In turning attention to this poem for the 
session, Derrida finds in D.H. Lawrence, a way of answering the question 






































Chapter Three: Here: Hegel and a Pet Dog 
 
Like a Dog! 
Kafka, The Trial 
3.1 Introduction to “Distischs on a Pet Dog (December 19, 1798)” 
Distischs on a Pet Dog (December 19, 1798) 
He runs in broad circles on the plane, we are his point of return; 
He searches in the earth, he catches sight of me and already frolics 
back to me. Where does he stay? 
Now he has found playmates. They taunt, run from, and search for 
each other ; 
He who hunts is hunted in turn. But look, they now run too far 
away. 
Here! The word tears him loose from instinct and compels him to 
return to his master. 
But a bitch pulls him off again to the right. Halt! 
Come back! He does not hear. The cane awaits you. I no longer 
see him. 
He sneaks along the hedge, bad conscience slows his pace. 
To me! You circle widely around me, and wag your tail, he must— 
Do you not see what “must” means? Now you see it. He cannot 
help it. 
You cry at the blows: Obey the commands of the master. (140) 
 
In the extensive oeuvre of Hegel’s writings that have been published and 
preserved, there are only a dozen poems among them. Of the poetry, 
“Distichs on a Pet Dog” are among the 5 poems composed between 1796 
and 1800 that are deemed his “most significant” (138). Karl Rosencranz 
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notes in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben that Hegel indeed had a 
poodle (83).   
 According to Jon Stewart, “Hegel’s poetry is of admittedly limited 
literary value” and their two-fold value lie in “historical interest and 
significance for an understanding of his intellectual evolution” and also 
“for understanding Hegel’s theoretical perspective in Frankfurt” (139). He 
is also of the opinion that The Frankfurt poems “do not require extensive 
analysis” (139). In addition, Stewart writes: 
As regards their subjects, it should be noted that they reflect 
Hegel’s ubiquitious preoccupation with nature and natural 
phenomena in this period and demonstrate his use of nature, 
especially organic nature, as a model for the harmonious resolution 
of antagonistic forces. (139) 
 
Stewart’s point that the poems, revolving around nature, reflect Hegel’s 
interest in nature at the time, is easily acceptable. However, there is a 
substantial difference between reading the poems as a reflection of Hegel’s 
“preoccupation with nature” to assuming that they are microscopic 
reflections of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. While the poems might indeed 
be read fruitfully as parergons with which to approach the system that 
Hegel would later develop, it is too much of a leap to conclude that they 
encapsulate or anticipate the system. Even though Hegel did have a pet 
dog, a literal dog as Levinas would say, it would be fallacious to 
unquestioningly identify Hegel as the figure of the master in the poem, 
and even more so, to identify the Hegel-master now created as the Hegel-
philosopher. This is exactly what Elaine P. Miller creates in her reading of 
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“Distisch on a Pet Dog” in The Vegetative Soul: From Philosophy of Nature 
to Subjectivity in the Feminine. Levinas has come under heavy critique for 
the displacement of animals in his philosophy though previous chapters 
have attempted to show that even within these thoughts, there are 
minimal openings by which, however indistinct, animal faces and voices 
may be discerned. With Hegel, however, the name of the philosopher and 
the reputation that comes with it have become obstacles of sorts to 
reading. Following Montaigne’s call to “interpret interpretation”, Miller’s 
antagonistic reading of “Distischs on a Pet Dog” will be read as an extreme 
example of prejudices against Hegelian thought in order to clear a path 
towards the revaluation of Hegel’s philosophy of nature and its potential 
to recognize the singular and different voices of animals. Miller’s criticism 
of Hegel will also serve as the guiding thread in the chapter.  Following 
and departing with her reading of the poem and of Hegel gives rise to the 
opportunity to read Hegelian Spirit as a Spirit of community within which 
animal voices may be heard.   
3.2 The Place of a Poem: Miller’s interpretation of “Distischs on a 
Pet Dog” in  “Hegel: The Self-Sacrifice of the Innocent Plant” 
Miller’s overall project in the book is to advocate a plant-like 
subjectivity, which could, in her words, “lead to a restructuring of feminine 
subjectivity in a way that would make a real difference to woman” (4). 
While her intentions are noteworthy, I would argue that, while attempting 
to open up a space for a new feminine subjectivity through rejuvenating 
Aristotle’s term, “vegetative soul” with a new direction, she is, 
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unfortunately, at the same time, imprisoning animal figures to her goal. 
By interpreting the pet dog as a figure of submission and then extending it 
to the symbolic representation of nature in Hegel’s later philosophy, Miller 
silences the possibility in Hegel of hearing the voice of the animal. This 
sacrificial rite is, ironically, a repetition of what, quoting Bataille, she 
criticizes in Hegel’s philosophy.  
Miller begins the chapter “Hegel: The Self-Sacrifice of the Innocent 
Plant” by a reading of Hegel’s poem where she identifies the master in the 
poem as the young Hegel. In her reading, Hegel becomes the master who 
abuses his pet dog. This young Hegel she presents becomes the basis with 
which she attacks Hegel’s later philosophy of nature.  This assumption of 
a stable, perpetual and inherently “monstrous” identity in Hegel in order 
to criticize the sacrifice his philosophy feeds on becomes a parody of itself, 
as Miller’s own reading becomes the very scene of sacrifice she criticizes. 
By criticizing the master of the poem and the poet as one continuous self, 
and at the same time, assuming the poem can be a transparent reflection 
of Hegel’s later philosophy, she parodies the very Hegelianism she is 
antagonistic towards and sacrifices the words of the poem in order to 
fulfill her teleological goal. As such, her literal reading of the master 
abusing the pet dog does far worse violence to the poetic, not literal, figure 
of the pet dog.  
 Miller begins the chapter “Hegel: The Self-Sacrifice of the Innocent 
Plant”, with the contention that “the description of Hegel’s interaction 
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with his pet poodle could almost encapsulate the dialectical method for 
which Hegel would later become famous” (120). To Miller, the poem “has a 
foreboding ring of what is to come” and is “an ominous sign of what would 
become Hegel’s attitude toward nature in general in his mature works” 
(120). This is despite her own acknowledgements that at the time of 
writing Hegel had “broached neither the philosophy of nature nor the 
dialectical method” (120). Miller’s strong desire to read the poem as a 
sinister foreshadowing of Hegel’s continual sinister attitude to nature 
causes her to interpret the poem according to her desires, often to the 
point of accusations and even personal attacks on Hegel that seem to drift 
from the words of the text.  
 In her reading of the poem, Miller claims that: 
But the dog, a mere animal without language or rationality, is 
distracted by other dogs, and, in particular, by a female dog who 
pulls him away from the spiritual, human, cycle of the master that 
Hegel indicates is higher than the natural, instinctual, sexual cycle 
that tempts the dog away. The master shouts “Stop!” and “Come 
back!” The words “tear [the dog] loose” from mere instinct, but he is 
weak, and the natural drive pulls him away again. The master 
shouts, and awaits the dog with a stick, determined to teach 
through pure force what could not be communicated rationally. 
Though the dog could not understand the words, the blows of the 
stick teach him the superiority of reason over pure natural impulse. 
(120) 
 
Miller’s own reading becomes self-contradictory when she goes on to 
describe that the dog manages to respond to the shouts of the master by 
tearing himself away from “mere instinct.” Miller’s accusation that in the 
poem, the master is “determined to teach through pure force what could 
not be communicated rationally” and that the dog “could not understand 
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the words”, blatantly disregards that throughout the poem, the dog is 
shown as being able to respond to the master’s command. In the poem, the 
two lines, “Here! The word tears him loose from instinct and compels him 
to/ return to his master”, is antithetical to Miller’s suggestion that the dog 
is “a mere animal without language or rationality”. Instead, the dog in this 
poem is not the dumb creature that Miller accuses Hegel of portraying but 
is shown as capable of response: a human calls, a dog responds. This is a 
scene of communication between two creatures, linked by the resonant 
word “Here!” In the instance of the poem, this dog responds to a language 
that though he seems to be able to communicate in return at this point, is 
not yet his own, a (mono)lingualism of the other.  
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida comments that the 
assumption that “the animal is deprived of language” is precisely the 
notion that the animal is deprived “of a response that could be precisely 
and rigorously distinguished from a reaction; of a right and power to 
respond, and hence of so many other things that would be proper to man” 
(32). Since the time Descartes wrote the fifth part of the Discourse on 
Method, arguing, as part of his mechanical philosophy, that animals can 
merely react but not respond, the issue of response has been a key 
criterion that has been used in the attempt to distinguish animals from 
humans (23-33). Derrida’s formulation of the issue of response shows that 
what is at stake when man reserves response for himself is the 
sovereignty of man in order that man might guard what belongs and is 
“proper to man” without threat from the animal other.  
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In her reading, Miller exhibits precisely this tendency to assume 
that the dog has no ability to respond since it is deprived of language and 
rationality. For her, the reason physical force is finally used on the dog is 
because it takes the place of “what could not be communicated rationally” 
since the “dog could not understand the words” (120). This is despite her 
own reading of the dog’s initial, albeit temporary, obedience to the words 
“Stop!” and “Come back!”  
However, in Miller’s haste to condemn the master and by extension, 
the poet Hegel, it is the poem that becomes enslaved in a reading that 
does not hear what it does not want to hear. The second time the dog is 
shown to disobey the words of the master, Hegel writes, “He does not 
hear”. The dog is too far away to hear the command of “Come back!” It is 
his master’s voice that the dog fails to hear. This distance between the dog 
and the master is reinforced by the lines “I no longer/ see him”. Miller’s 
choice to read the dog’s inability to understand words when the poem 
states that the dog did not hear the words is akin to interpreting that the 
master is blind when the speaker says he is unable to see the dog. Miller’s 
reading of the poem is a violent butchering with a clear agenda of 
denigrating Hegel through presenting him as a philosopher who claims, 
through the poem, that animals do not have language and are thus 
irrational. But nowhere in the poem is this evident. Rather, though the 
method is questionable: the decision to teach the dog to obey, already 
presupposes the master’s conviction that the dog is not a dumb creature 
beyond teaching.  
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 Miller’s prejudices against Hegel become evident when she launches 
into insidious personal attacks in her descriptions of Hegel at points 
throughout her chapter: 
One cannot help visualizing a patronizing young Hegel, his face 
either calm and smiling or red with righteous indignation, 
repeatedly beating his dog with a stick “for his own good” for not 
realizing that heeding the master is spiritually higher than 
indulging in the pleasures of the senses. (120) 
 
Miller’s admission that she “cannot help” visualizing this caricature of 
young Hegel, echoes the words of the poem referring to the pet dog, “He 
cannot/ help it”. It would be grossly unjust to read Miller’s use of “One 
cannot help” as an indication that she is a creature of ‘mere instinct”. Yet 
this is what Miller herself does to the dog in the poem. Who is it that does 
greater violence to this pet dog and by extension the poem? The master in 
the poem resorts to physical force in order to teach his pet dog a lesson, 
and Miller jumps to conclusions in the poem in order to master it for her 
purpose of denigrating a philosophy. Miller’s irresponsible interpretation 
that within the poem, the pet dog is a creature of mere instinct attacks not 
only the “patronizing young Hegel” but also the figure of the pet dog. It is 
the interpretation that turns the dog into a dumb animal.  Miller ignores 
the dog’s ability to learn in the poem and the point where the speaker 
interprets the dog’s behavior as having “bad conscience”. This imputation 
of “bad conscience” to the dog is, at the very least, an indication that the 
speaker does not consider that the dog is a dumb animal without response. 
It even provokes the idea the speaker is here allowing the dog a kind of 
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ethical understanding, since to have a bad conscience, to know it has done 
wrong, the dog must first be able to distinguish between right and wrong. 
Miller also chooses to ignore the bond between master and dog in 
this poem even though the playfulness of the dog in the poem seems to be 
emphasized by the poet. The poem begins with the dog running in “broad 
circles”. Upon seeing his master, the dog “frolics” back but is distracted by 
“playmates”. Miller is intent on painting a portrait of Hegel as a cruel 
master and the dog as the victimized slave. Yet, by alluding to the 
master/slave dialectic and by presenting the dog as a miserable 
subordinated creature, Miller’s reading does not reconcile with itself. If 
the dog is indeed the slave in the poem, then it would entail that Hegel is 
imputing that it has self-consciousness. In Kojève’s reading of Hegel 
(which Miller shows that she follows through Bataille and will be 
discussed later) the master/slave dialectic is the struggle of the master 
and slave: the confrontation of two consciousnesses in the fight to achieve 
self-consciousness. If that was indeed the case, then Miller’s reading 
would suggest that in the poem, the speaker and the dog are both 
creatures of self-consciousness and in so doing, Hegel’s dog would become 
a creature with self-consciousness. Yet, Miller reads the dog as being a 
mere animal without language or rationality. Miller’s presentation of the 
dog as a slave and the master in the poem as Hegel the Master is not so 
much a reading of Hegelian dialectics but a reading with an agenda of 
portraying the atomistically identified speaker-poet-philosopher as a 
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strong, cruel man, with an imagined a shrill voice, who is bullying a pitiful 
dog. 
Even the shifts of address in the poem from the third person “he” to 
the more intimate use of the second person pronoun “you” is dismissed by 
her as a “result of carelessness”: 
The alternation of perspective within the poem, though probably 
the result of carelessness rather than explicit poetic intention, 
intensifies the uneasy feeling the poem creates in the reader: in the 
moments when Hegel speaks of the dog as “he,” he (Hegel) is distant 
and descriptive, if utterly anthropocentric: “He runs in wide circles 
on the plain, we are his point of return.” Yet as soon as he speaks 
directly as master to the dog he becomes shrilly insistent upon the 
necessity of the lower animal’s obedience and subservience (“You 
scream at the blows: Obey the commands of the master”). At this 
moment the pet dog becomes a metonym for nature itself, and the 
relationship of master and dog can serve as an analogy to the way 
in which Hegel will approach nature. (emphasis author’s, 120-1) 
 
Despite Miller’s first conjecture that the change of perspective 
within the poem is due to Hegel’s carelessness, she develops a reading out 
of the “uneasy feeling” that she thinks this alternation creates in “the 
reader”. She claims that the speaker only addresses his dog directly to 
bark “shrilly insistent” instructions at the dog. The dog is addressed thrice 
in the poem. In addition to the line she quotes, the sentence “The cane 
awaits you” could also fit into her theory. However, in her neat 
generalization, she leaves out the innocuous line, “You circle widely 
around me, and wag your tail”, which shows no hints of the shrill 
insistence “upon the necessity of the lower animal’s obedience and 
subservience” that she reads into every direct address to the dog (121).  
Miller’s blind spots in reading this poem could be due to her stated desire 
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for the dog to become the representative of nature in Hegel’s philosophy. 
(Bobby, the paradoxical last Kantian in Nazi Germany and now this 
unnamed dog as the figure of victimized nature in Hegelian philosophy-- 
Can a dog ever be literally a dog?) Miller develops the asymmetrical power 
relations she reads between master and dog in the poem to an analogy 
between Hegel and innocently-victimized nature. In Miller’s reading the 
vast differences between the poet and the philosopher are reduced to 
sameness: the poem and philosophy, the poem and actuality, Hegel as a 
young man and as a mature philosopher. Ironically, it is the text of this 
poem that has been sacrificed in Miller’s reading-- a sacrifice that she 
makes in order to attack Hegel’s “monstrous” philosophy of nature for 
being a philosophy that requires sacrifice.   
3.3 The Vegetative Soul vs. The Animal Organism 
The question of the animal, of the plant, or the human, or plants, 
animals, and humans, and even the stone which the lizard lies on, need 
not be advanced at the expense of the other. Why must there be 
hierarchies where what we call “human”, “lizard” or “stone”, in order to 
gain sovereignty, must overcome the other? In Hegel’s poem and 
philosophy, Miller sees “subordination” throughout. Yet, in her own work, 
the plant becomes sovereign, and the animal, subordinate. Proving the 
sovereignty of one by opposing it to the other only repeats oppositional 
logic and further fuels the fight for sovereignty which blocks the way to 
what we might think of being-with and of unavouable communities.  
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This is the definition Miller gives of what she calls the vegetative 
soul: 
The vegetative soul is radically opposed to the figure of organism as 
autonomous and oppositional; its stance toward the world is 
characterized by the promise of life and growth, not the avoidance 
of death and loss. Furthermore, its individualism is much less 
radically defined, is subject to metamorphosis, and maintains an 
identity that transfigures itself over time. (5) 
 
If the vegetative soul is to be different from the figure of the organism and 
move us away from oppositional figures, how then could the vegetative 
soul be opposed to that of the organism? By arguing for a plant-like 
subjectivity based on it being “radically opposed” to that of the animal and 
then arguing against the animal as being an atomistic figure of 
representation, Miller is missing the opportunity to apply the same radical 
thinking she seeks to bring to plants, to animals. Though Miller criticizes 
Hegel’s philosophy of nature for sacrificing the plant to the animal, 
Miller’s work reverses this opposition she identifies and instead, sacrifices 
animals to plants.  
3.4 Spirit is not Only Human 
Much of Miller’s criticism of Hegel rests on a misunderstanding of 
what Hegel calls Spirit. Miller opposes the necessity of sacrifice in Hegel 
and she is especially suspicious of the process by which the plant reaches 
fulfillment in becoming food for animals. She sees Hegelian philosophy as 
an endless chain of sacrifice that culminates in human subjectivity. In her 
presentation, Hegelian philosophy becomes a humanistic project as the 
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“progression of spirit” becomes a “progression that culminates in human 
subjectivity”: 
Hegel’s mature philosophy of nature ultimately subordinates all of 
nature to the progression of spirit, a progression that culminates in 
human subjectivity understood to be gained at the price of its 
natural origin. […] With Goethe and other contemporaries such as 
Novalis and Schelling, Hölderlin believed that examining the 
human relationship with nature can illuminate fundamental truths 
about human existence, and that human being can be understood 
only in conjunction with nature. For Hegel, by contrast, nature has 
a value only in the process of understanding the primitive 
beginnings of what will evolve into spirit, that is, into human 
thought and action. Hegel finds a value in studying nature only as a 
means of understanding the history of spirit, that is, of 
understanding a spiritual history or ancestry of life forms leading 
up to the creation of the human being. (121) 
 
Miller conflates Spirit with human subjectivity. When Miller mentions 
Spirit, she critiques it as a kind of human Spirit, or Spirit that belongs 
only to the human. However, Spirit is disinterested and impersonal. For 
Hegel, Absolute Spirit is the aim of philosophy, not a philosopher. As 
Hegel presented it, there are three divisions of Spirit—the subjective 
Spirit, the objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit. Hegel’s philosophical 
system as presented in the Encyclopedia is also divided into three parts: 
I. Logic: the science of the Idea in and for itself 
II. The Philosophy of Nature: the Science of the Idea in its 
Otherness 
III. The Philosophy of Spirit: the science of the Idea come back to 
itself out of that otherness.  
The Philosophy of Nature, along with the preceding part, Science of Logic, 
form the basis for The Philosophy of Mind, also known as The Philosophy 
of Spirit. In §384 of the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel writes “The Absolute is 
 76 
Mind (Spirit)”. Geist is neither the human mind nor the human spirit 
although it is dependent on the human mind. Geist is also dependent on 
logic and nature. In the Science of Logic, the goal of Spirit is the “Begriff ” 
or freedom. Spirit is not only dependent on the human mind-- it also needs 
nature and logic in order to reach its goal.  
Gaining an understanding of the history of Spirit before the human 
being does not end with the creation of the human being, as Miller 
suggests. Miller holds the idea that, in Hegelian thought, nature is merely 
“nothing more than” Spirit’s past and nature must be abandoned in order 
for it to reach its goal (140). However, the history of Spirit culminates in 
Absolute Knowledge, and this, Miller herself will go on to argue following 
Bataille, is not possible within history. If it is not possible for the Absolute 
to obtain self-realization, then nature and logic cannot just be “a means of 
understanding” for humans. Nature and logic, being respectively the 
Absolute for itself and the Absolute in itself, are thus never merely just 
understood and then dismissed. Understanding of the Absolute for itself 
and the Absolute in itself is a perpetual process, much like the progress of 
Spirit towards the goal of freedom. Hence, Miller’s use of Goethe, Novalis, 
Schelling and Hölderlin as positive examples that “the human being can 
be understood only in conjunction with nature” are not as far from Hegel’s 
thought as she presents (121). Absolute Knowledge is precisely the 
conjunction of logic, nature and Spirit, as the organization of the 
Encyclopedia neatly suggests. Absolute Knowledge, if it is to be 
understood at all, cannot be understood apart from nature. Thus, Miller’s 
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assertion, that “nature has a value only in the process of understanding 
the primitive beginnings of what will evolve into spirit”, verves far off the 
mark (121). In the introduction to The Philosophy of Nature Spirit is not 
merely the end of nature but also it’s beginning: 
Nature is the first in the point of time, but the absolute prius is the 
Idea; this absolute prius is the last, the true beginning, Alpha is 
Omega. (19)  
 
In § 381 of The Philosophy of Mind, Hegel elaborates that: 
From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of 
which it is the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. 
(emphasis author’s, 8)  
 
The relationship between mind and nature is not one-sided: Spirit does 
not merely evolve out of Nature but also comes before it. Nature and Spirit 
are, from the very first to the very last, inseparable. Spirit is not human 
spirit but the human is also necessary for its spirit to achieve its goal of 
freedom. In this way, nature is not discarded after it has been a means 
towards understanding, as Miller interprets, but nature and Spirit, and 
the human by way of it, have always already been bound.  
Spirit is not just what comes after nature, but precisely because it is 
the aim of nature, Spirit is also what comes before.  In the final section of 
the Encyclopedia’s Philosophy of Nature, Hegel makes this impossible 
relationship between Spirit and nature explicit:  
Spirit, just because it is the goal of nature, is prior to it, Nature has 
proceeded from spirit: not empirically, however, but in such a 
manner that Spirit is already from the very first implicitly present 
in Nature which is Spirit’s own presupposition. But spirit in its 
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infinite freedom gives nature a free existence and the Idea is active 
in Nature as an inner necessity; just as a free man of the world is 
sure that his action is the world’s activity. (emphasis author’s, 444)  
 
The bounds of Spirit and nature are characterized by both freedom and 
necessity. As she did with the pet dog in the poem, Miller tries to present 
nature as enslaved to Spirit when she states:  “Spirit is destined to be the 
master of nature” (122). However, Spirit is not just to be opposed to 
nature, as Miller’s words above suggest. According to Hegel, Spirit is 
always already “implicitly present in Nature”. As such, the interplay 
between spirit and nature is not about the subordination of the one for the 
other because nature is not forced to destroy itself in order that spirit may 
evolve. Rather, nature has always presupposed and contained Spirit 
within it. This is why The Philosophy of Nature is also “the science of the 
Idea in its Otherness”. 
3.5 Spirit as Community 
Much of Miller’s argument is derived from Bataille, whose reading, she 
states, is also based on Alexander Kojève’s reading of Hegel. Miller 
concludes from her reading of Bataille, through Kojève, that Hegelian 
philosophy can be read as a scene of sacrifice, exemplified by the “self-
sacrifice of the innocent plant” as she titles her chapter on Hegel: 
Thus, Bataille sees sacrifice as the key to understanding dialectic. 
And so, we may understand the plant’s self-sacrifice as following 
this prescribed pattern, in an unconscious manner. Indeed, Hegel’s 




Bataille sees the failure of the dialectic as a failure to rein in the excess of 
death and its link to joy and desire. Heinz Kimmerle sums up in “On 
Derrida’s Hegel Interpretation” that Bataille reads Hegel via Kojève’s 
reading of the master-slave dialectic: 
[Bataille] wants to save the laughter at death that finds expression 
in sacrifice from Hegel’s one-sided interpretation of death. This 
interpretation of Hegel arose on the basis of the commentary of 
Alexandre Kojève on the section of the master and the slave in the 
Phenomenology. Bataille, however, makes Hegel more one-sided 
than, in fact, he is. For Hegel fully acknowledges a moment of 
desire and pleasure in the movement of the negativity. Destruction 
is always at the same time a preserving, a resurrection always 
follows death. (229) 
 
Kimmerle points out that contrary to Bataille’s interpretation, the 
movement of the Aufhebung is joyful. To do so, he points out the part at 
the end of the Encyclopedia where Hegel writes: “the eternal in-itself and 
for-itself existing idea acts, creates, and enjoys itself as absolute spirit’ 
and that cognition takes part in this” (qtd in Kimmerle, 229). Hegel too 
has laughter on his side.  
In “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without 
Reserve” Derrida shows that Bataille’s idea of sovereignty, which aims to 
displace Hegel’s philosophical history, is actually dependent on Hegel’s 
master-slave dialectic. Furthermore, this master-slave dialectic that 
Bataille aims to displace reaches him via the influential but also 
controversial anthropological-revision of Alexandre Kojève.  
In the Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève boldly declares 
that “Consciousness (Bewusstein) is the general term for man in the 
 80 
Phenomenology” (261). With this interpretation Kojève creates an 
anthropological reading of Spirit that becomes the basis of Miller’s 
criticism. Kojève’s reading of Hegel puts man on the stage of world 
history. Miller’s reading of Hegel’s poem, together with the ad hominem 
attacks she resorts to, are examples of the suspicion currently shown to 
the anthropocentric Hegel that Kojève’s reading has created. This is the 
hubristic Hegel whom Miller, along with many others, holds in contempt, 
for whom Man alone becomes the ultimate objective of world history and 
all else becomes subordinate. In lieu of this, Miller’s readiness to present 
the relationship between the dog and the “Master” in “Distischs on a Pet 
Dog” as an uncomplicated, one-dimensional demonstration of the cruelty 
of the master-slave dialectic in terms of an asymmetrical power structure 
without redemption can be seen as a continuation of the resistance 
towards Hegelian thought characterized as the philosophy of humanity 
aspiring to be the Absolute. 
In Kojève’s (reading of the) Phenomenology, the evolution of Spirit 
becomes a drama of human self-consciousness, and the Absolute which 
articulates itself becomes a mouthpiece for human spirit to articulate 
itself. Man becomes spirit. Man speaks. The Absolute as an abstract, 
thinkable entity encompassing Logic, Nature and Man, takes on human 
shape, as if the end of Hegelian philosophy is to champion Man as The 
Absolute. The problem with this is pointed out in Stuart Barnett’s 
Introduction to Hegel after Derrida, where he compares Kojeve’s approach 
to Hegel’s to that of Jean Hyppolite’s: 
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In these lectures Kojève presented a willfully strong reading of 
Hegel. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Kojève’s 
interpretation was his insistence on an anthropological foundation 
to Hegel’s thought. Dismissing issues of theology, indeed, of 
ontology itself, Kojève focused on the notions of self-consciousness 
and history. Kojève paid little heed to what was clearly a central 
tenet of the Phenomenology—that it is the Absolute that articulates 
itself, as subject, through nature and human history. For Kojève, 
Hegel’s philosophy is fundamentally a theory of the historical 
evolution of consciousness. (15) 
 
As Barnett puts it later on, Kojève’s reading of Hegel is an 
“anthropothanatological” reading. Furthermore, Kojève’s reading 
materializes Hegel’s notion of spirit. According to Kojève: 
Hegel’s Spirit is not therefore truly a “divine” Spirit (because there 
are no mortal gods): It is human in the sense that it is a discourse 
that is immanent to the natural World and that has for its 
“support” a natural being limited in its existence by time and space. 
(emphasis author’s, qtd in Barnett, 15) 
 
In Barnett’s analysis, Kojève turns the evolution of spirit from the 
“emanation and self-articulation of the Absolute” into the 
“anthropogenetic self-articulation of discourse” (15). Thus it is not Hegel 
that is anthropocentric but Kojève’s reading of Hegel that is so. Kleinberg 
also comments in Generation Existential on “the influence that Kojève 
anthropocentric use of Heidegger’s philosophy in the reading of Hegel had 
on the generation of 1933” (83). Kojève’s first sentence in this first lecture 
of his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, “In Place of an Introduction” is 
“Man is Self-Consciousness”. This clearly sets out his agenda in his 
reading of Hegel. In summary, while Hegel has a dialectical 
understanding of nature, Kojève prioritizes human beings by prioritizing 
the Philosophy of Spirit, and in his reading, only humans could create, 
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negate and or change since only humans had freedom. By combining this 
with his readings of Marxist materialism, Kojève thus creates a Hegel 
whose philosophical project becomes one of establishing human identity 
and human subjectivity.  
 At this point, where all voices are tentatively lost to the human 
voice, it is a moment of hopefulness that there are other voices raising 
questions to a human subjectivity-based reading of Hegel. Catherine 
Malabou’s question on human subjectivity and language in The Future of 
Hegel is resonant here: 
However, if this were the case, and human subjectivity were for 
Hegel something immediate like a transparently reflecting crystal, 
how could it have a place for delirium, madness, the primordium 
night? Why would the anthropological development take so long, 
concluding with language rather than beginning with it? (65) 
 
Malabou’s reading of human subjectivity in Hegel is a human subjectivity 
that does a disappearing act. In her words, “When man makes his 
entrance into the speculative narrative he does so in the guise of a 
farewell” (75). While the human is essential to the speculative 
development of Spirit, subjectivity is not wholly human. Human 
subjectivity is neither the goal, the sole means, nor the full story of Spirit’s 
non-linear progress. As Malabou puts it:  
After the Philosophy of Spirit, man will no longer be the subject of 
its speculative development. This means that subjectivity, on its 
way to its fulfillment as absolute spirit, no longer bears a human 
shape and severs itself from any strictly anthropological basis. (75) 
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Malabou’s refusal to read Hegelian philosophy as wholly anthropocentric 
is joined by the voice of another French philosopher, Jean-Luc Nancy, who 
warns that: 
The Hegelian subject is not to be confused with subjectivity as a 
separate and one-sided agency for synthesizing representations, nor 
with subjectivity as the exclusive interiority of a personality. Each 
one of these can be moments among others of the subject, but the 
subject itself is nothing of the sort. In a word: the Hegelian subject 
is in no way the self all to itself. It is, on the contrary, and it is 
essentially, what (or the one who) dissolves all substance—every 
instance already given, supposed first or last, founding or final, 
capable of coming to rest in itself and taking individual enjoyment 
in its mastery and property. (emphasis author’s, 4-5) 
  
The Hegelian subject is not the anthropological subject. Misunderstanding 
of this point is to find Hegel guilty without a trial, to condemn his 
philosophy for anthropocentrism and, in so doing, to miss the chance to 
think of a future in Hegel thought that could help propel us beyond the 
univocally human. This is the still-turning on which everything depends. 
The assumption that the Hegelian subject is, before all else, the 
autonomous self of a human being leads to unwarranted criticism of 
Hegel. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading, the Hegelian subject does not come 
either come before or after the Aufhebung and is neither singularity nor 
universality, but is that which can be “first or last”, “founding or final”. As 
Jean-Luc Nancy points out, to identify the human subject as the Hegelian 
subject is to read Hegel ideologically and non-philosophically: 
The reader of Hegel who does not understand this understands 
nothing: he has surreptitiously presupposed an ideological notion of 
the “subject” – a notion that is nonphilosophical, individualist, 
egoist, and “liberal”—or, a notion no less ideological, 
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“communitarian,” nationalist, or imperialist. (5) 
 
Returning, at last, to Hegel’s poem with which Miller opens her chapter, it 
becomes clearer why she bases her critique that Hegel uses nature for the 
passage of Spirit in her reading of Hegel’s poem. She also assumes that 
her reading of the poem reflects the structure of existence in the 
Encylcopedia: 
If, as Mueller puts it, this poem illustrates the cycle of freedom, 
natural necessity, estrangement of self, and return to self, then the 
“self” of the dog is understood only in its relationship to a higher 
level of nature, namely the human being. As we will come to see, 
this is indeed the case with every level of organic nature as Hegel 
describes it in the later versions of the Encyclopedia. (121) 
 
Whereas in Mueller’s account as provided by Miller, the poem is an 
illustration of “estrangement of self” and “return to self”, Miller splits this 
self up and, while seeming to develop her reading out of Mueller’s, 
changes it drastically by referring to the first “self” as that of the dog and 
the second “self” as that of a human being.  Just as she ignores the 
necessity for nature to destroy itself for Spirit only because Spirit was 
already always part of nature, here, Miller ignores the possibility that the 
dog and the master in the poem could be part of the becoming of a larger 
“self”. While Hegel would not think that a dog is continuous with a human 
being, the differences between a dog and a human being are superseded by 
their community in Spirit. The concept of Spirit in Hegelian philosophy 
can be regarded as a thought of community. Coming too fast to a 
conclusion on Hegel’s thought (and his character) would be to miss the 
chance to think a way out of the woods. Hegel’s much-neglected 
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Philosophy of Nature, suspended in between The Science of Logic and The 
Philosophy of Mind, is important not just for understanding the Hegelian 
system, but, can contribute significantly to the current discussion of the 
question of the animal since the idea of Spirit binds logic, nature and 
spirit into a progressive being-with such that no element is autonomously 
a subject on its own. 
 
Il faut parler. Parler sans pouvoir. 
[You must speak—speak without the power to 
do so] 












Chapter Four: Where Stretches the Gigantic City 
It is five o’clock in the morning, I am writing to you on the terrace, the sun is 
going to rise in front of me, over Lago Maggiore, everyone is sleeping, I made 
myself coffee all alone, without making a sound. And, as every morning, 
with only a cat for witness. Here his name is settembrino… 
Derrida, Counterpath 
4.1 Animot: More than An Idea Waiting to be Thought 
Once, in the middle of summer, in Paris, Annette Messager stepped 
barefooted on a dead sparrow. She recounts in an interview: 
That was a strange, indescribable sensation, and I said to myself: 
these birds are close to us but we know nothing about them, any 
more than we know our neighbours, so I decided to tame them, in 
my own way.  
 
She adds:  
There is as much ignorance between these familiar birds and 
human beings as between a man and a woman. (15) 
 
What does it mean to step on a dead bird? The collision of Messager’s body 
and that of the dead sparrow is an instance of skin-to-skin contact across 
the boundaries of human and non-human, life and death. If, as Heidegger 
proposes in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, “a dog does not 
exist but merely live”, then animals cannot be regarded as beings-toward-
death but, being ontologically impoverished, own neither life nor death as 
such. Messager, from a place of height, steps unknowingly on the carcass 
of a bird already dead on the ground. Her experience exemplifies the 
encounter with animals within literature and philosophy, where what is 
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designated under the term animal is always infected by ghosts and at 
least twice dead.  
Later on, in view of this experience, Messager created the Boarders, 
a series of works that featured lifeless sparrows arranged to mimic 
everyday human situations. In one of them, titled “Boarders at Rest (Le 
Repos des pensionnaires)”, 1971-72, Messager showed rows of sparrow in 
knitted garments, placed to give the impression of them sleeping 
peacefully. It is hardly distinguishable which of the sparrows are 
taxidermized deceased birds or surrogate sparrows created by Messager 
out of feathers and wool. Perhaps these strange creatures, 
anthropomorphized in knitwear, suspended between sleep and death, both 
birdlike and humanlike and thus, neither fully human nor avian, are a 
fitting metaphor for the complexities of the animal question in human 
thought. The sparrows and surrogate sparrows, some of which are dead 
and some of which were never alive, lie in a case, innocently, like sleeping 
children that the artist is caring for. Messager herself claims that her 
work is an attempt to “tame” wildlife, forcing non-human animals, 
especially in death, into humanlike caricatures. This is also precisely what 
has been the case in much of the history of Western thought with regards 
to non-human animals where animals have been conceived of in their 
difference and deprivation as compared to humanity. Yet the animal is 
also, paradoxically at the same time, talked to, thought about, played 
with, written about and judged, as if it was a version of the human 
animal. If Messager’s knitting of sweaters for dead birds and created birds 
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might seem strange, it is only a reminder of the strangeness of our 
everyday relation to animals. The phenomenon of dogs and cats that are 
dressed up and even put through human rituals, such as enacting dog 
weddings, are just examples of the modern conundrum whereby dogs are 
both humanized and yet, non-humanized. In Encounters with Nature, the 
ecologist Paul Shepard wrote an essay titled “The Animal: An Idea 
Waiting to be Thought”. To rewrite this intriguing title in the plural as 
Derrida has taught us is necessary, I propose here that animals are indeed 
ideas waiting to be thought-- and yet more. 
4.2 Speak without the power to do so 
The following exchange took place between a seminar participant (SP) and 
Heidegger on July 6, 1964 at the home of the Swiss psychiatrist, Medard 
Boss, in Zollikon, Switzerland: 
SP: Then how is it with an animal? 
MH: Again, it is a different relationship toward space. The animal 
does not speak. The human being is a [zoon logon ekhon]. The 
animal does not experience space as space. 
SP: What does this “as” mean? 
MH: The animal is acquainted with the ditch it jumps over as a 
simple matter of fact [Sachverhalt], but not as a concept. 
SP: The animal cannot reflect. 
MH: Is language so essential. Surely there is also a way of 
communicating without language. (emphasis author’s, 16) 
 
On the one hand, this exchange, published in the Zollikon Seminars, 
repeats Heidegger’s assumption more than 3 decades earlier in 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics that the animal, unlike the human, 
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does not have access to things as such. In the 1929/30 lecture course, 
Heidegger, on his way to describing what world is, shows first that “the 
animal” does not have full access to it and is therefore poor in world. Just 
as Levinas was thrown the question of animals in the “Paradox of 
Morality” interview when his theme is the phenomenology of the face, 
here, in the July 6, 1964 seminar, Heidegger, trying to explain being to 
medically trained doctors and students, has not mentioned the word 
“animal” before the seminar participant asked “Then how is it with an 
animal?”. Both Levinas and Heidegger have extensive oeuvres. The parts 
of their philosophies that have been discussed so far function as examples 
that show what is symptomatic in philosophies that attempt to reach 
general concepts, whether of being or alterity, that appear to be all-
encompassing and yet revolve around humans. Repeatedly, these 
moments in philosophy reveal that the attempt to built a coherent and 
consistent philosophical narrative can be contradicted by their reliance on 
patterns of restrictions and limitations to the other, such as the figures 
and specificities of animals. In such examples, the distinction between 
animals and humans become that of the have and have-nots, and issues of 
power and of invisible and invented class differences, between the one who 
proclaims to be sovereign and the one who is deemed the beast, need to be 
addressed further.  
On the other hand, merely condemning philosophers for repeatedly 
excluding animals in their philosophies and for being anthropocentric in 
their worldview could itself be a reactionary, compensatory or inadequate 
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response, especially if the basis for this strange recurrence, this haunting 
of animals in philosophies within which they were murdered in absence, 
remains unclear.  Near the end of Rogues, Derrida cautions that “it would 
be impudent and hasty, in truth hardly reasonable, to oppose 
unconditionally, that is, head-on, a sovereignty that is itself unconditional 
and indivisible” (emphasis author’s, 158). Attempting to overthrow one 
sovereign power by upholding another-- an example of which is Miller’s 
attempt to subsitute the vegetative soul in place of animality—only 
perpetuates the sovereignty of exclusionary binary logic. Merely 
attempting to choose between the vegetative, the animal or the human 
only results in a stalled Aufhebung where oppositionary forces lie 
scattered without the opportunity for an encounter, face-to-face and open 
to the Spirit of community.  
If, according to Heidegger in the exchange quoted above, “the 
animal does not experience space as space”, where then are animal spaces, 
where the animal that does not speak, speaks? Heidegger also says in the 
exchange, “Surely there is also a way of communicating without language” 
(16). But this is impossible, according to Heidegger himself, and the next 
time he speaks, he says, “The human being cannot comport himself in any 
way without language” (16). Impossible to speak without language and 
yet, surely there is also a way. Which way? In Rogues, Derrida, still 
discussing sovereignty, suggests translation: 
It remains to be known, so as to save the honour of reason, how to 
translate. For example, the word reasonable. And how to pay one’s 
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respects to, how to salute or greet (saluer), beyond its latinity, and 
in more than one language. (emphasis author’s, 159) 
The question of “comment parler à mon chien?” cannot be answered 
without recourse to translation. Rather than reserving language for a 
certain class of animals such as humans, translation, necessarily across 
languages, names the process necessary to prepare for the coming of the 
other. To be ready to welcome the other, who or what this other may be, it 
is necessary to translate. But “It remains to be known” just “how to 
translate”. Translation, in every event, is haunted by impossibility and the 
ghostly remnants of what does not survive translation. In Aporias, 
Derrida refers to “a sort of originary mourning” as what has eluded the 
thoughts of Heidegger, Freud and Levinas (39). Heidegger and Levinas’ 
lack of cognizance of what Derrida terms originary mourning may be 
attributed to their blindspots with regards to animals. 
4.3 Mourning, Speaking, Dying 
Mourning, the possibility of speaking to animals arises from the 
same possibilities of writing and of death. Both present and absent in 
every inch of human writing, animals are another manifestation of the 
phenomenon of ghosts. The words with which we have to write about 
animals empty themselves out. In Politics of Friendship, Derrida describes 
the Aristotelian ideal of perfect friendship as a telos “towards which one 
must tend even if it is never reached” (221). At the same time, “the telos 
remains inaccessible because it is inconceivable, and inconceivable 
because it is self-contradictory” (emphasis author’s, 222). Speaking to a 
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dog will always be an act filled with contradictions. In Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas writes: “the face of the Other [Autrui] at each moment 
destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me” (50-51). In “The 
Trace of the Other”, Levinas says “the phenomenon which is the 
apparition of the other is also a face” (351). Death always already haunts 
the relation with Autrui. The Levinasian face has always been ghostly, it 
is an apparition, which appears and disappears.  
The poem below by Michael Fried, included in the collection The 
Late Derrida, pays tribute to the place of animals in Derrida’s thought by 
imagining a scene where multitude of animals, beyond count, gather 
under a sky coloured by metaphysics to bid farewell “to one who held them 
in his thought”:  
The Death of Jacques Derrida  
Somewhere in the north, a vast lake, partly frozen. Snow covering 
the ground, on the fir trees, in the distant hills. The sky a deep, 
radiant, metaphysical blue. Cold wind blowing in gusts. A 
magnificent day.  
No humans in view, that’s the important thing. But from the dark 
recesses of the forest there one by one or in small squads comes 
forth an ordinarily mutually shunning population of foxes, wolves, 
bear, elk, deer, beaver, otters, raccoons, porcupines, hares, moles 
wincing at the light, skunks, squirrels, field-mice, voles, no doubt 
other, lesser creatures as well—all seemingly pacific, self-contained, 
one might say preoccupied. And for perhaps an hour they mill or 
skitter or in a few cases leap about, to no apparent purpose, the 
stronger taking care not to step accidentally upon the weaker. After 
which they return to the forest, silently for the most part.   
On the snow: tens of thousands of hoof and paw prints, involuntary 
brushings of tails, urine traces, steaming turds, even a few crimson 
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specks of blood. A message of farewell to one who held them in his 
thought. (207) 
 
With the recent English translation of The Beast and the Sovereign and 
more lectures that remain unpublished, the full force of what Derrida 
brings to animal studies is indeed still to-come. Derrida’s claim in 
“Violence Against Animals” that all his “deconstructive gestures […] 
consist in questioning the self-interested misrecognition of what is called 
the Animal in general” may be taken as an extravagant rhetorical move 
(63). However, Derrida’s lifelong concern with fissures and the aporia 
between singularity and repetition means the question of the animal is not 
merely a late development in his thought as marked by The Animal That 
Therefore I Am and The Beast and the Sovereign. As parergonal spirits 
that refuse to exist within clearly demarcated borders, phenomenal 
manifestations and presence-in-absence of animals in writings that come 
forth from human hands-- these very hands that define themselves 
against that which they write about-- function not unlike the elusive yet 
critical displacement in the neologism “Différance”. 
Throughout this thesis, from time to time, animals have been 
referred to as ghostly, almost invisible spectral beings that elude clear 
categorization. In an undated letter to his translator Milena Jesenská, 
published in the collection Letters to Milena, Kafka laments to Milena that 
all “the misfortune” of his life “derives, one could say, from letters or from 
the possibility of writing letters” (229). Letter writing to him is: 
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an intercourse with ghosts, and not only with the ghost of the 
recipient but also with one’s ghosts which develops along the lines 
of the letter one is writing and more so in a series of letters where 
one corroborates the other and can refer to it as witness (229).  
 
And yet he writes. In the same letter he unequivocally states “how I hate 
letters” and that he is “writing only as the result of an incident” (229). The 
letter, however, preserves the scene of writing as an eternal present even 
as it performs the ghostly duties that Kafka has discovered himself 
helpless against. Yet, not to write is no escape. Kafka too knew this. 
Further down the same letter to Milena, still on the phenomenon of ghosts 
breeding in letters, he writes: 
I’m surprised that you haven’t written about this yet, not in order 
to prevent or achieve something with its publication, for that it is 
too late, but in order to at least show “them” that they have been 
recognized’. (230) 
 
Even though writing will only contribute to the proliferation of ghosts, not 
writing does not provide a sanctuary, since the conditions of possibility for 
writing are also the conditions of possibility for living.  
Who forms the community that Kafka refers to as “them”? The 
ghosts that breed between letters and between a letter are innumerable, 
impossible to count and need not only be human. It is precisely the 
recognition of the originary disaster that has befallen writing that allows 
us to both mourn, take our chances and in so doing, have futures and 
words like animot that illuminate futures. What makes language mad is 
thus also what Derrida calls the ‘gift of language’ in Monolingualism of the 
Other (65). There, Derrida writes that it had always been easier for him ‘to 
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bless this destiny’ (65). James K. A. Smith states in his 2005 work entitled 
Jacques Derrida: Live Theory: “For in the end -- or better, from the 
beginning -- Deconstruction is a work of love” (xv). “Deconstruction”, this 
Heideggerian coinage that, through Derrida, has entered the popular 
imagination to suggest something like “cleverly taking apart”, is a forceful 
word through which the echo of destruction still rings. Less audible, is the 
note of pathos in the word. In “Hostipitality”, after working through the 
logical aporia that if forgiveness is possible, it must forgive the impossible, 
Derrida crucially reminds us that it ‘is not only a cold and formal 
contradiction or logical dead end’ he identified but also a “tragedy of 
compassion” (385). Our chances, as illuminated by Derrida’s writings, are 
not chances as opposed to necessity but chances inseparable from our 
determination by the divisibility of the mark that determines writing. 
Writing promises a future but this promise, this fidelity to what is to-
come, must be a promise of an unexpected destiny, which could be 
monstrous in its unrecognizability, its unyielding otherness. 
4.4 The Gigantic City to-come: Beginning Again Before the End 
In this vast, uncertain space between philosophy and literature, 
where new languages are always on the verge of being poetically invented 
and heard, it may be almost possible to no longer distinguish between “the 
human” or “the animal”, without admitting to confusion, to fear, to 
strategies of sovereignty (for better or for worse), or a giving up of 
responsibility and a turning away of the face. Though it may not be 
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possible, or desirable, to stop the ghosts in writing, Kafka, in writing, 
shows the ghosts that they have been recognized. The same goes with the 
words, “human” and “animal”. It is too late to stop them from 
disseminating but it is still possible to write about them, to excavate them, 
to bore holes in them, until they overlap and contaminate, crossbreed and 
have monstrous babies that are hardly separable or oppositional, like non-
identical monozygotic twins or unknown hybrids.  
Kafka’s “A Crossbreed” was found under the title “Eine Kreuzung” 
in notebook “D” of Kafka’s Oktavhefte. It was composed in 1917 and 
published posthumously on 27 March 1931 in the journal “The Literary 
World”.  The narrative presents the dilemma of the first person narrator 
who has inherited “a curious animal, half kitten, half lamb” (426). This 
crossbreed is an anomalous singularity who resists generic categorization 
and according to the narrator’s observation “almost insists on being a dog 
as well” (427). The liminal and impossible space this hybrid creature 
occupies could be precisely where all unabashed references to “the animal” 
lie: somewhere between an exceptional and singular animal as a biological 
creature and “the animal” as an imaginary being, hybridized and 
bastardized from all animals.  
Neither kitten nor lamb nor dog, this hybrid is a monstrous 
creature that, like many animals and animal-human hybrids in Kafka’s 
writings, is at once familiar yet strange. According to the narrator’s 
observation, this creature “feels unhappy in its own skin” (427).  Perhaps 
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this simultaneously lamblike, kittenlike and doglike creature, with no 
close blood relation, is the mascot for the future still to-come with regards 
to interspecies relations. Towards the end of the story, the narrator 
contemplates the burden his mad inheritance brings and, like D.H. 
Lawrence’s persona in “Snake”, thinks of killing the creature that 
befuddles him. The narrator is torn between subjecting the monstrous 
creature to “the butcher’s knife” to maintain it since it is “an heirloom” 
(81). This dilemma still hangs suspended today: Heidegger’s lizard, 
Hegel’s dog, Levinas’ snake and Bobby the wild dog, among many other 
named and unnamed animals in literature and philosophy still remain to 
be slaughtered, forgotten or encountered. The question and place of 
animals and human beings are intimately bound. What is at stake has 
never just been “the animal” in the sense of the distant biological other 
removed from the self-crowned privileged “us” of human beings but also 
the becoming-being of “the human being” or human becoming.  
Kafka’s narrator in “A Crossbreed” recalls the British folk fable of 
Dick Whittington who gained sovereignty as Lord Mayor of London 
through “his sole inheritance from his father, a cat” (81). Derrida’s cat, 
unnamed in The Animal That Therefore I Am forms the inheritance of 
animal writings through which the destabilized “we” must become the 
animals that therefore we are.  Not the animal that I already, 
instantaneously am, but that “therefore I am”, with “therefore” signaling 
the delay, the process and the necessity of becoming what must be: no 
longer human but not yet animal.  Questioning with regards to animals is 
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therefore, a process of human-becoming. Having begun with the 
necessarily unanswerable questions, “What is an animal? What is a 
human being?”, this thesis will end with borrowed words from the ending 
of Kafka’s parable, an ending which opens up the question of new vistas 
to-come: What shall I become through my animal? Where stretches the 
gigantic city? (81).  
 
                                                              No longer animal but not yet human 
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